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This dissertation project aims to build upon the literature of positive theories of legislative
politics, and provide three more nuanced stories about various stages in the U.S. House of
Representatives: rules making, committee composition, and floor voting.
The chapter, Conditional Nature of Rules Changes, examines why the U.S. House of
Representatives has changed its standing rules regarding the principle of majority rule and
minority rights. I begin by taking a critical look at previous studies on this subject, after
which I propose an alternative theory on the conditional nature of rules changes. The
empirical findings reveal that different combinations of factors are required for the two
distinct types of rules changes. In particular, the size and homogeneity of the majority party
are the main factors for promoting majority rule while the size of the majority party and the
dimensionality of policy space are the main factors for creating minority rights.
The chapter, Minority Party Members on Committees, questions why a generic legislature allows minority party members on committees. If the majority party considers the
minority a burden, then it could choose to exclude minority party members entirely from
the committee system. This has, however, rarely happened in history. This chapter provides one possible explanation to this puzzle via a simple signaling game. In equilibrium,
I show that the majority party has an incentive to include the minority party delegation
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on the committee. By allowing the minority to make a public speech on the uncertainty,
the majority leadership can constrain the majority committee delegation in a way to serve
the party in general: the majority committee delegation, in equilibrium, moderates the bill
proposal in order to respond to the minority’s public speech.
The chapter, Special Rules and Dimensionality, is one of the first attempts to investigate
the determinants for dimensionality of individual bills. I first develop a theory on partisan
manipulation of dimensionality by focusing especially on the role of restrictive special rules
in the House of Representatives: party leaders try to reduce the dimensionality of individual
bills in order to have clear party image and to avoid ugly defeats. I collect every piece of
“major legislation” identified by Clinton and Lapinski (2006), and record the contents of
their special rules. Ultimately, the data demonstrate that restrictive rules contribute to lower
dimensionality.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

Approaches to studying legislative politics prior to the 1970s largely drew from sociology, which paid special attention to the norms and functions of legislative organizations
as well as legislators themselves. Since human beings are supposed to interact with one
another through a group, the group develops prescriptive and descriptive norms to function effectively. A shared norm defines a certain group, and a set of norms becomes an
institution. For example, Matthews (1960) analyzes norms (also known as folkways) that
strongly influence the individual behavior of Senators. They include apprenticeship, workorientation, specialization, courtesy, reciprocity, and institutional patriotism. Fenno (1962)
describes the House Appropriations Committee as a social system that shares similar roles
and jurisdictions. The committee is integrated by the norms of subcommittee unity and
minimal partisanship, and has been maintained through internal socialization process and
sanctioning mechanisms.
An alternative approach is a rational choice perspective that originally borrowed from
economics. Early work such as “paradox of voting” and “impossibility theorem” (Arrow
1951) and “median voter theorem” (Downs 1957; Black 1958) taught political scientists
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that the rationality assumption could be useful in analyzing politics. Riker (1962), for
instance, utilized the game theory to demonstrate the principle of “minimal-size coalitions.”
Legislative studies, in particular, developed a trend that can be summarized as a “positive
theory.”1 Goal-seeking individual legislators are influential in deciding internal structures
and policy outcomes. They are constrained by rules and institutions, and are involved in
strategic interactions with one another. Because utilities are attached to goals, legislators
are subject to a rational calculation of the costs and benefits associated with their purposive
actions. Fenno (1973), among others, establishes these principles in an explicit way and
analyzes six standing committees in the House. Mayhew (1974) proposes the idea of singleminded reelection-seeking legislators and explains various activities by legislators as well
as congressional organization.

1.1

Positive Theories of Legislative Politics

We live in a complex world, where only a few issues are salient and many others are latent.
From time to time, a new issue becomes salient and some fade away. There is no stable and
constant arrangement of issues and interests in nature. Congress, as a collective body of
elected officials, reflects this complex nature. However, it also needs to function effectively,
so the essence of congressional politics has been to structure the legislative motivations
and interests in a way that serve for a certain group in Congress. Political parties have
performed this role throughout most of American history, but standing committees, regional
groups, and cross-party coalitions have been influential as well.
1
According to Amadae and Bueno de Mesquita (1999), the term, positive theory, was first invented by
Riker. It means that political scientists “make positive statements about political phenomena, or descriptive
generalizations that can be subjected to empirical verification” (270).
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In the chapters that follow, I build on a literature that has characterized the motivations
of legislators and organization of Congress in several ways. While all of them have a common ground that is considered as a positive theory or a rational choice perspective, each
has its uniqueness. Among others, I want to focus on three general perspectives and their
variants: distributive, informational, and partisan perspectives. As it will be clear later in
this introduction chapter, the primary goal of the dissertation is to take multiple theoretical
approaches to better understand legislative politics. If we avoid strictly following one and
only one perspective and try to accommodate several valuable approaches at the same time,
we can examine the complex feature of Congress in a more systematic way.

Chaos Theorem and Distributive Perspective
The distributive perspective was an attempt to answer a puzzle raised by social choice theories in the 1970s. Social choice theories focus on the equilibrium properties of majority
rule. A puzzling finding is that an equilibrium does not exist under general circumstances,
which is famously known as the “chaos theorem” (McKelvey 1976; Schofield 1978). Assume an m-dimensional policy space X ⊆ Rm , and consider a policy choice x ∈ X by
n-person legislature. The legislature operates under a system of pure majority rule where
any member can propose a policy x to change the status quo, xo . For any point, x ∈ X,
we can think of a win set at x, W (x), which commands the support of a majority against x.
As such, the chaos theorem shows that, for all x ∈ X, W (x) = ∅. In other words, one can
construct a sequence of alternatives between any two points in a multidimensional space
that will lead from the starting to the ending point under the majority rule. This implies
that majority rule cycles exist (i.e., instability).
Contrary to the theoretical prediction, policy outcomes and institutional choices are
generally quite stable in reality. Shepsle (1979) took a significant step to solve this paradox.
His contribution was the concept of a jurisdictional system that partitions a multidimen3

sional choice space into subsets of single issues that are voted on one at a time. Under this
jurisdictional system, such as the committee system in Congress, and under the germane
amendment requirement, Shepsle shows that there is an equilibrium, a “structure-induced
equilibrium.”
The distributive perspective, then, provides a rationale for the existence of the committee system in Congress: It is designed to distribute particularistic benefits to individual
member’s constituents (Weingast and Marshall 1988). The starting assumption is that the
primary goal of legislators is reelection (Mayhew 1974). Legislators design the committee
system as multiple committees with mutually exclusive and exhaustive jurisdictions of their
own. This system generally allows members of Congress to gain membership on the committees most relevant to their own constituencies and to pursue the strongest constituency
interests there. Because constituencies are relatively diverse and heterogeneous, this system could benefit every member without hurting others. Moreover, the committee system
as a whole would work as a giant logrolling device via “gains from trade.”

Informational Perspective and Pivotal Politics Thesis
The informational perspective clashes with the distributive perspective in respect to the role
of the committee system: it is designed to meet the needs of the parent chamber by providing information about policy (Gilligan and Krehbiel 1987, 1989; Krehbiel 1991). The
underlying assumption is that a legislator’s main goal is policy (mostly unidimensional).2
The two postulates in this theory are (1) that the majority of the chamber chooses the institutions under which they operate (majoritarian postulate), and (2) that members, as well as
the chamber as a whole, have uncertainty over how their policy choice translates into the
actual outcome (uncertainty postulate). Because legislators care about policy outcomes,
2

Note a difference between the informational and the distributive perspectives with respect to goals. Under
the distributive perspective, a legislator’s main goal is reelection.
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they have an incentive to devise an institution that helps minimize or eliminate the uncertainty of their policy choice. The committees serve as information-providing experts, and
ultimately promote the interests of the parent chamber as a whole.
The pivotal politics thesis by Krehbiel (1998) is an extension of the informational perspective, but with a slightly different focus on floor politics instead of the committee system. Following the median voter theorem, he argues that the policy outcome will be at
the position of the chamber median. In addition, a few more pivotal legislators play a
role. Due to the presidential veto, the 2/3s member in the president’s side becomes a “veto
pivot.” Similarly, due to the filibuster in the Senate, the 3/5s Senator against the proposed
bill becomes a “filibuster pivot.” The interactions among these pivotal members on the
floor produce the legislative outcome.

Partisan Perspectives
In reaction to the lack of attention given to political parties, scholars have proposed theories about political parties. Political parties form in order to solve several social choice
and collective action problems. First, political parties could function as an institutional arrangement that yields a structure-induced equilibrium (Aldrich 1995, 37-45). Or, political
parties could serve as an extra-legislative organization that leads to a stable voting equilibrium (Cox and McCubbins 1994). Each is a strategy designed to solve the social choice
problem, more specifically the puzzle caused by the chaos theorem.
Second, political parties could be a solution for the collective action problem (Cox and
McCubbins 1993). In the electoral process, the reputation of political parties, which is
often referred to as a “brand name,” plays an important role. It affects both the individual
candidate’s personal probability of reelection and, more substantially, the party’s probability of securing a majority. However, a party’s reputation depends significantly on its record
of legislative accomplishment and the act of legislating is akin to team production that re5

quires collective action. Members of political parties delegate the agenda setting power to
a central leadership and, therefore, political parties perform as a procedural cartel.
Under this perspective, committees are used to promote partisan goals, especially for
the majority party. Membership on powerful committees or constituency committees are
usually obtained by supporting the party agenda. Disloyal partisans are sometimes deprived
of favorable committee memberships. In general, the committee system works as a rewardpunishment mechanism for the party (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 1997). Moreover, the
majority party functions as a procedural cartel that guarantees favorable outcomes for the
party on the floor (Cox and McCubbins 2005). In particular, the majority party has been
extremely successful in keeping bills off the floor and the committee agenda that would, if
passed, upset majority of its membership (i.e., negative agenda power).
Another theoretical attempt is made by Rohde (1991) and Aldrich (1995): conditional
party government thesis. They argue that the importance of political parties in Congress
varies over time. As the homogeneity of majority party members increases, and as the
inter-party distance between the majority and the minority parties increases, rank-and-file
legislators delegate greater authority to their party leadership. As a consequence, political
parties and their leaders that possess more authority and power, pursue their party-based
policies more aggressively.

Party Effects
While theories of political parties emerge, a criticism of party influence in Congress is also
developing at the same time. For example, Krehbiel (1993) argues that preferences, rather
than party affiliations, drive the behaviors of congressional members. According to him,
parties in Congress are composed of a group of legislators who have similar pre-existing
preferences. The seemingly partisan behavior is actually an observational equivalence of
ideological behavior. Therefore, the significant party behavior, if any, should be “behavior
6

that is consistent with known party policy objectives but that is independent of personal
preferences” (Krehbiel 1993, 240).
In reaction to Krehbiel’s criticism, one group of scholars opposes his definition of significant party behavior. Smith (2007), for instance, argues that political parties and their
leaders do not care about the “statistically significant” and “independent” party effects.
Rather, they care about winning at the margin of the legislative battles in the name of political parties. In other words, Krehbiel’s concept is not measuring what is important in the
“party’s mind.”
Another group of scholars, however, try to uncover an independent party influence.
First, Snyder and Groseclose (2000) choose lopsided roll-call votes (greater than a 65-35
split) to measure real preferences of congressional members. The reasoning is that the party
leaders will not usually try to influence their members’ voting behaviors on the pre-decided
lopsided roll-call votes. So, this party-free measure from lopsided roll-call votes serves as
the baseline for estimating party effects on the close roll-call votes. Although there are
some concerns about the measure for moderate members (McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal
2001), their measure produces a very good match with a survey-based ideology measure
(Ansolabehere, Snyder and Stewart 2001).
Second, Sinclair (2002) looks at the votes of both special rules and final-passage motions. If all legislators vote on the rule according to their preferences about the bill, the
rule and the bill votes would be identical. In practice, the two votes are far from identical.
Rather, majority party members are more likely to vote for the rule even when they are
opposed to the bill. This indicates a party influence. Third, there is a quasi-experimental
research design: comparing members who are constrained by party pressures and members who are not. For example, Jenkins, Crespin and Carson (2005) divide congressmen
into three groups: normal reelection seekers, higher-office seekers, and retiring members.
Compared to the other two types, retiring members do not have partisan connections, so
7

their roll-call records would be different if there was party pressure in Congress. Jenkins
and Nokken (2008) also deal with members in lame duck sessions. In a lame duck session,
exiting members are free from partisan constraints while returning members are not.

1.2

Need for Multiple Perspectives

Theoretical developments in legislative politics, at first, look as if they are mutually exclusive and competing. Some have emphasized one perspective at the expense of the other
perspectives. However, different theories have significantly enhanced our understanding
of the U.S. Congress, and have driven the accumulation of vast knowledge about congressional politics.
Above all, it should be clearly pointed out that different positive theories are not mutually exclusive in nature. We sometimes observe different assumptions and different predictions. In fact, as rightly noted in Shepsle and Weingast (1994), they are addressing
different aspects of legislative organizations and legislative politics. Distributive functions
by committees, for instance, do not prevent us from examining partisan aspects of committee politics. The fact that committees provide expertise for the parent chamber does not
mean that committees must not produce distributive benefits for constituents. Rather, the
insights of multiple theories are likely to be required to account for complex features of
congressional institutions and behavior. There are two types of rationale for this.
First, we require multiple perspectives because legislators have multiple goals. Congress
is a representational (elected) and a policy-making institution that has an internal organization that creates incentives of its own. The result is that legislators are likely to have
multiple goals. Obviously, electoral goals are the primary goals for every individual member in Congress (Mayhew 1974): they should be reelected. At the same time, individual
members care about policy. Making good public policy is a key for reelection, and legisla8

tors ultimately want to be elected in order to create good policies. As such, every legislator
has multiple goals, and these multiple goals lead to multiple types of strategies and strategic
interactions (Smith 2007). More important, this consequently produces legislative organizations that are multi-functional. It is, therefore, essential to have multiple approaches in
order to examine multi-functional organizations.
Multiple goals for political parties are also important for legislative theories. A collective interest for a good policy has always been a significant force that brings all members
under the party flag. At the same time, it helps to gain and maintain a majority status. By
and large, political parties design and utilize legislative organizations in order to serve for
these collective but multiple goals. At the same time, political parties mediate multiple
goals of individual members. In many cases, parties face conflictive goals of individual
members. The collective party goals and the individual member’s goals are also incompatible from time to time. Political parties and party leaders resolve these conflicts and
require multiple strategies (Sinclair 1995; Smith 2007). Therefore, we require a variety of
theoretical approaches to study legislative organizations in a systematic way.
Another way to justify the use of multiple approaches is to focus on the dimensionality
of policy space in Congress. Dimensional structures vary from one context to another. They
are driven by forces inside and outside of Congress that can affect legislators’ perceptions
of decision-making space. Different theories, therefore, include distinct characterizations
of dimensionality. The distributive perspective, for example, assumes a highly multidimensional policy space whereas the information perspective simply assumes a unidimensional
space. The partisan perspective has variation with respect to multiple dimensions: the theoretical foundation does not rule out the possibility of multidimensional policy space while
unidimensionality is conveniently assumed for both the negative agenda control thesis (Cox
and McCubbins 2005) and the conditional party government thesis (Aldrich, Berger and
Rohde 2002).
9

The relevance of dimensionality in theorizing legislative politics becomes more important when we observe the interaction between dimensionality and political parties. We live
in a multidimensional world where all the different issues and interests are represented
in the government through political parties. Parties tend to pay more attention to salient
issues, which have historically fallen along the liberal-conservative dimension (Aldrich
1995). From time to time, political parties even utilize this dimension for the party’s interest by structuring the choice sets. However, simultaneously, this makes the existing
parties vulnerable to the threats of cross-party coalitions once the threats are based on multidimensional issues, surely issues not dominated by the liberal-conservative dimension.
Therefore, partisan politics, especially in Congress, is a constant effort to balance multiple
dimensions in a way that serves the collective interests of the parties. As a consequence,
partisan strategies result in different dimensional structures, which require multiple theoretical approaches.
Viewed as the sum of its chapters, this dissertation project aims to build upon the literature of positive theories of legislative politics and provide three more nuanced stories about
various stages in the U.S. House of Representatives: rules making, committee composition,
and floor voting. Each chapter is a very nice example of combined theories and multiple
approaches for each stage of the legislative game.

1.3

Dimensionality and Political Parties

Chapter 2 and Chapter 4 specifically deal with the relationship between dimensionality and
political parties. In fact, these two chapters reflect my view on congressional politics and
American politics in general. Before we discuss the chapters in detail, it would be best to
elaborate how political parties function in a multidimensional world.

10

As I mentioned earlier, one of the most important functions that political parties serve
in democracy is to represent various interests in the electorate. Political parties in the
United States were first created as gatherings of like-minded people (Dawson 2000), but
were developed later into current forms by mobilizing and representing interests of voters
(Holt 1992). Now, we cannot think of political parties without considering the core values
that they support in and outside the government.
The interests that political parties represent are fundamentally multidimensional in nature. Interests often can concern the most salient liberal-conservative dimensional issues,
but they also can concern less salient but long-standing interests such as urban-rural conflicts. Additionally, issues can concern a completely new dilemma that appears all of a
sudden. In general, interests in the electorate are diverse and heterogenous over the regions, and change over time.3
As a result, the policy space in Congress is also multidimensional. In many cases, a
package of several dimensional issues is usually attached to the political party (Campbell
et al. 1960). There are even clear and sometimes sharply drawn lines between the two
parties (Aldrich 1995). However, these distinctions are tendencies, not certainties. Each
political party is a coalition of many and diverse groups (Sundquist 1983). Furthermore,
what issues constitute the multidimensional policy space vary over time and across different
groups of legislators.4
Poole and Rosenthal (1997) argue that, “the first dimension, throughout most of American history, has captured the main economic conflicts between the two major political parties” (114). Economic conflicts that belong to the liberal-conservative dimension have been
3

With a slightly different focus, pluralism literature (e.g., Dahl 1962) explicitly deals with why this is the
case and how this becomes a general trend in the United States.
4

The literature on the “party system” (e.g., Sundquist 1983) explicitly examines how this has evolved in
American history.
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the first and the most salient dimension throughout American history, and have served as
a default cleavage both in the government and in the electorate. However, this first dimension has not entirely dominated other dimensions for all policy areas over time (Crespin and
Rohde 2007; Roberts, Smith and Haptonstahl 2008). In fact, Poole and Rosenthal (1997)
could not accurately observe other dimensions because their NOMINATE technique inevitably favors the discovery of low dimensionality.5
More important, I argue that political parties have utilized the presence of this salient
“first” dimension. Because the liberal-conservative dimension has been a default cleavage
between the two parties, observing this dimension automatically leads to a partisan division, which ultimately increases the unity of party members in voting. Or, it could be the
case that the presence of salient “first” dimension is the result of constant and long-term
strategic endeavors that two political parties intentionally have pursue. By and large, some
unidimensional setting that we observe in Congress could be a by-product of a party’s effort
to structure the choice sets.
At the same time, I also argue that political parties who have heavily utilized the liberalconservative dimension in the past would be vulnerable to the threats of cross-party coalitions. These coalitions are usually formed to pursue their own collective policy interests,
possibly multidimensional policy interests. An electoral consideration is also involved because their collective policy interests, in most cases, come from their constituents.
Chapter 2 deals with the later claim that political parties, especially the majority party,
are vulnerable to the threats of cross-party coalition if the policy space in Congress is not
constrained to be unidimensional. In addition, chapter 4 examines the former claim that
the unidimensional policy space in Congress is a by-product of party’s efforts to structure
the choice sets of individual members.
5

This is due to the orthogonality assumption that their spatial voting model has.
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Conditional Nature of Rules Changes
Chapter 2 examines why the U.S. House of Representatives has changed its standing rules
regarding the principles of majority rule and minority rights. When there is a suppression
of minority rights, it is considered “pro-majority” change. When additional minority rights
are created, it is “pro-minority” change. I begin by taking a critical look at previous studies
on this subject, Binder (1996) and Schickler (2000), after which I propose an alternative
theory on the conditional nature of rules changes.
Binder (1996) emphasizes the “strength” of the majority party, which is composed of
the party’s seat share and ideological homogeneity. A strong majority party (with a large
size and/or homogeneous members) tends to promote pro-majority changes while a weak
majority allows pro-minority changes. Schickler (2000), on the other hand, focuses on the
role of the median member of the House floor. He argues that when the floor median moves
toward the majority party, it is likely to have pro-majority changes. Alternatively, when the
floor median moves toward the minority party, pro-minority changes are likely to occur.
These previous accounts are, however, limited in that a single factor in each description
drives both directions of rules changes. We must not simply assume that one factor explains
two types of changes at the same time. Rather, we have to empirically test whether or not
there exist multiple factors in promoting rules changes in the House.
In contrast, I argue that House rules changes have a conditional nature. First, the two
types of changes are fundamentally different in nature. Pro-majority changes largely favor
the majority party leadership and the majority party in general, but pro-minority changes
are not exactly opposite. I posit that pro-minority changes have occurred to promote the
interests of explicit cross-party coalitions (from the progressive coalition in the 1910s to the
conservative coalition until the 1960s), whose common policy interests were not aligned
with the traditional liberal-conservative dimension. Therefore, the dimensional structure is
essential for pro-minority changes, but not for pro-majority changes.
13

Second, the two sub-factors (size and homogeneity) should be analyzed separately because they are negatively correlated with each other, and the floor median’s move is actually
a function of both factors. A large majority can afford to push pro-majority changes regardless of dimensional regime types. In contrast, a small majority is vulnerable to pro-minority
changes only under the two-dimensional regime, where the cross-party coalition has their
own policy interests to pursue. A homogeneous majority promotes pro-majority changes
without a difficulty whereas a heterogeneous majority has little impact on pro-minority
changes: a withdrawal of power also requires the collective action.
I employ the multinomial logit model in order to assess the conditional nature of rules
changes (in contrast to Binder’s two logits or Schickler’s ordered logit). I find that different
combinations of factors are required for the two distinct types of rules changes. In particular, the size and the homogeneity of the majority party are the main factors for pro-majority
changes while the size of the majority party and the dimensionality of policy space are the
main factors for pro-minority changes.
It is worth reemphasizing that this chapter shows a nice example of the need for multiple approaches. First, I deal with multiple goals and possible conflicts of these goals. The
collective policy goals of the majority party is a driving force for pro-majority changes that
promote majority rule. Multidimensional policy goals and electoral goals are the basis for
cross-party coalitions, which advocate changes for minority rights. So, rules changes are
fundamentally based on the conflict between collective partisan goals and individual member’s goals (but mobilized as cross-party coalitions). Second, this conflict is reinforced with
the role of dimensionality. Under the multidimensional policy space, cross-party coalitions
are more easily formed and become powerful threats to the majority party. This is not
the case under the unidimensional regime. With multiple goals and the multidimensional
regime in place, we require multiple theoretical approaches.
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Special Rules and Dimensionality
Chapter 4 is one of the first attempts to investigate the determinants of dimensionality for
individual bills. Some have argued for a unidimensional Congress while others have shown
multidimensionality in the congressional voting alignment. Recent studies show that levels
of aggregation contribute these different characterizations of congressional policy space.
However, at every level of aggregation, there is variation in dimensionality to be explained.
In particular, individual bills are subject to a careful examination because most spatial
theory accounts of Congress are based on an assumption of dimensionality at the bill level.
I aim to assess the determinants of this variation in dimensionality by focusing on the role
of restrictive special rules in the House of Representatives.
My theory on partisan manipulation of dimensionality actually benefits from the partisan perspective of Cox and McCubbins (1993, 2005) and the heresthetics theory of Riker
(1986). First, Cox and McCubbins’ partisan perspective suggests that political parties have
an incentive to create a unidimensional voting bloc. Since the liberal-conservative distinction is the default cleavage in Congress, a voting coalition is most easily constructed along
this liberal-conservative dimension. With this voting bloc occurring regularly, the party
image or the party brand name is clearly reinforced over time. In addition, political parties
can avoid unpredictable defeats due to multidimensional voting.
Second, my partisan manipulation theory builds upon Riker, and argues that a welldesigned special rule could effectively produce a unidimensional voting record. When the
bill is reported on the floor, party leaders could include several amendments that belong
primarily to the liberal-conservative dimension with the hope that this new (but liberalconservative) dimension becomes the salient “secondary” dimension about which Riker
spoke. Then, party leaders can have their preferred outcome, and, at the same time, minimize the possible influence of unexpected dimensions to ruin the contents of the prearranged bill. As a result, the final voting record looks as if it were unidimensional.
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To investigate, I collect every piece of “major legislation,”6 and record the contents
of their special rules. Ultimately, the data demonstrate that restrictive rules contribute to
lower dimensionality. As such, the findings strongly support my partisan manipulation
theory, and ultimately the partisan perspective in general as an explanation of the relationship between restrictive rules and dimensionality. Political parties and party leaders utilize
restrictive rules in order to manipulate dimensionality.
While Chapter 2 deals with the consequence of multidimensional policy space in Congress,
this chapter suggests a possible origin of unidimensional voting assignment at the individual bill level. Political parties and their leadership intentionally reduce the dimensionality
of bills in order for the collective partisan policy goals as well as for some electoral goals.
The collective partisan policy goals are to create an easy voting coalition with a favorable
party brand name. The electoral goals are to generate a clear but not-ugly image of the
party. Therefore, it would be fair to say that multiple goals of political parties are deeply
related with the low level of dimensionality in Congress.

1.4

Committee Composition and Political Parties

In Chapter 3, I consider a situation where the informational function by committees
(the core argument by the informational perspective) can also serve the interests of the majority party. This is a nice combination of the informational perspective and the partisan
perspective. I adopt the partisan perspective because my primary concern is the relationship between the majority party leadership and the majority party committee delegations.
I also adopt the informational perspective because committees are supposed to provide an
expertise on policies so my focus is on the informational role of minority party committee
delegations.
6

They are identified by Clinton and Lapinski (2006)
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Legislative Theories on Committee Bias
In fact, the question that this chapter raises is originated by the literature on committee
bias. First, all three major theoretical perspectives have discussed whether or not committees are composed of outliers. The distributive perspective argues that committee members
are highly unrepresentative of the House because they have high demands for the policy
outcomes of their jurisdictions. Members of certain committees get more benefits from the
polices in their jurisdictions than non-members (Weingast and Marshall 1988). And, members whose districts need higher demands for certain policy benefits usually get assigned
to a committee that controls those policies (Adler and Lapinski 1997).
Both the informational and the partisan perspectives argue against the distributive perspective on committee bias. Since the chamber as a whole and the political party serve
as principals of committees, committees should be representative of their principals. By
using various interest-group ratings, Krehbiel (1990, 1991) shows no difference between
committee medians and the floor median. By using both ADA and NOMINATE scores,
Cox and McCubbins (1993) also show no difference between the majority party medians
in “partisanly-important” committees and the majority party median as a whole.
Another angle to the committee outlier issue is to examine the self-selection process
of the committee assignment. Shepsle (1978) analyzes the committee request data of the
Democratic Party, and concludes that the committee assignment has been largely a selfselection process: individual members request the committee membership based on their
needs (largely electoral needs or goals), and the party’s Committee on Committees mostly
accommodates the requests based on the demand-and-supply base. Smith and Ray (1983)
do a pre- and post-reform comparison, and find that the self-selection process continued
even after the reform of the 1970s.
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Although the self-selection process has been used to argue for the distributive perspective, it does not logically or empirically lead to committee outliers in an automatic way.
Multiple needs from heterogeneous members as well as from two different parties cancel out the outlier effects, which is observationally equivalent to the consequence of the
informational perspective (Frisch and Kelly 2005). Moreover, as argued in the partisan
perspective, the party leadership allows self-selection because it does not get harmed by,
and sometimes benefits from, the self-selection process.
The debate on the existence of committee bias (or high-demand outliers) is not the end
of the story. Scholars also have tried to identify the conditions under which committees
become more unrepresentative of their principals (either the parent chamber or the party
caucus). At the same time, a methodological debate revolves around how we measure the
concepts of bias and outliers.
Hall and Grofman (1990) carefully examine the logic of the distributive perspective
on committee bias, and specify conditions under which committee bias can be observed.
First, we have to use jurisdiction-specific measures. Second, we must look at committees
whose jurisdiction is narrow and homogeneous. Third, if the committee’s jurisdiction is
broad, then the bias can be observed in the subcommittee levels. Hall and Grofman use
constituency-based and agriculture-specific measures to examine the Agriculture Committee and several Agriculture Subcommittees, and find considerable bias on the committees.
On the other hand, Gilligan and Krehbiel (1990) utilize a signaling model, and derive
the conditions under which committees should have preference outliers. The larger the cost
to specialize in the committee, the more extreme are the optimal committee preferences.
And, the greater the uncertainty in the policy environment, the less extreme are the optimal
committee preferences.
Based on the externality of policy outcomes produced by the committee, Cox and McCubbins (1993) classify committees into three categories: uniform-externality, targeted18

externality, and mixed-externality committees. Since every member should be equally
interested and equally uninterested in the jurisdictions whose policies are uniformly distributed among constituencies, the uniform-externality committees tend to be microcosms
of their party caucus. On the other hand, targeted-externality committees could attract interested members whose reelection probabilities depend on the committee’s policy outcomes,
which indicates unrepresentativeness of committee members.
Maltzman (1995) focuses on the salience of committee’s jurisdictional issues. Committees that address issues of high salience are more likely to adopt the view of their parent
chamber because these committees’ choices are more likely to be scrutinized by the floor.
With the similar logic, party delegations on highly salient committees are more likely to
be representative of their party caucus. By utilizing jurisdiction-specific roll calls, he finds
that prestige and policy committees (high- and medium-salience committees) are more representative of the chamber than constituency committees (low-salience committees). And,
constituency committees are composed of more unrepresentative majority party delegations
than policy and prestige committees.
Hurwitz, Moiles and Rohde (2001) posit that, since the policy output from even a single
committee could be multi-dimensional, committee bias depends on the dimension with
which the policy is aligned. By looking at voting records for multiple amendments, they
find that agriculture policies in the 104th House contain two major dimensions (distributive
and partisan dimensions), and that committee members are unrepresentative of the chamber
only for distributive dimensional amendments. As for partisan dimensional amendments,
committee members show voting patterns fairly representative of their party caucuses.
There are two notable patterns in the line of research on committee assignments and
committee bias. First, it has focused only on principal-agent relationships: committee vs.
parent chamber and party delegation vs. party leadership. It has ignored the inter-party
relationship. Chapter 3 adds one more element to the theory: majority party leadership on
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the floor vs. minority party delegations on committees. Given that there are minority party
members on committees, the majority party could come up with a strategy to deal with
minority party members. The majority can choose to eliminate the minority representation
entirely from the committee system. If this option is infeasible or if this option is worse for
the majority party, then what does the majority party leadership do? These are the questions
to be answered.
Second, with the exception of the pure informational perspective, committees are treated
as if they serve mainly for members’ electoral goals. The role of political parties are involved, but only through the heterogeneity of committee jurisdictions (Cox and McCubbins
1993) or the salience of committee outputs (Maltzman 1995). In Chapter 3, I rely only on
the pure policy goals of individual members on committees, and demonstrate the conflict
between individual goals and collective partisan goals. Moreover, I show that, even under an exceptionally partisan setting (i.e., the majority party entirely dominates the policy
making both in committees and on the floor), a bipartisan arrangement appears due to this
conflict.

Minority Party Members on Committees
The chapter starts by asking why a generic legislature allows minority party members on
committees. In other words, why does the majority party tolerate minority party members
on committees? If the majority party considers the minority a burden, then it could choose
to exclude the minority party members entirely from the committee system. This has,
however, rarely happened in history. This rarity suggests the question: What benefits do
minority party members on committees provide to the majority party on the floor? I provide
one possible explanation to this question via a simple signaling game.
There are three players in the game: the majority party committee delegation, the minority party committee delegation, and the majority party leadership. They collectively choose
20

the policy, but the uncertainty is attached to the policy choice when it is implemented in
a real world. Since this uncertainty is observable only by committee members (from both
parties), the majority party leadership requires them to send signals: the bill proposal by
the majority party committee delegation and the public speech on the uncertainty by the
minority party committee delegation. Then, the majority party leadership simply accepts
or rejects the bill proposal upon receiving signals.
The majority leadership’s ultimate decision in the game is then whether or not it constructs the committee system by including the minority party delegation in addition to the
majority party delegation: Majoritarian Committee System (with only the majority party
delegation) vs. Bipartisan Committee System (with both the majority party and the minority party delegations).
I argue that, in equilibrium, the majority leadership has an incentive to include the
minority party delegation on the committee. Specifically, the majority party can be better
off under the Bipartisan setting than under the Majoritarian setting. This stems from the
fact that the minority delegation makes a public speech about the uncertainty. Although
the minority delegation does not have any bill proposal power in the model, it constrains
the majority delegation in a way to serve the majority leadership in general: the majority
delegation, in equilibrium, moderates the bill proposal in order to respond to the minority’s
public speech.
This constitutes an informational rationale for the presence of minority party members
on committees. Without relying on normative arguments or a repeated game framework, I
show that the majority party can expect to be better off by having minority party members
on committees.
While this chapter and the other two chapters look disconnected at first, the core message that I would like to reiterate is actually quite simple: we require multiple theoretical
approaches in order to better understand an interesting phenomenon in Congress.
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The general and overarching theme of the dissertation is the role of political parties in
the U.S. House. Political parties have been the main device in Congress that structures
the legislative motivations and interests so that multidimensional interests result in stable
policy outcomes. At the same time, an extensive focus is given to a combined use of
multiple theoretical approaches. In this sense, the dissertation as a whole proposes a new
direction of research. However, each chapter itself could also be understood as a separate
stand-alone essay with its own theoretical and empirical contributions to the discipline. As
such, three essays follow and the dissertation concludes by suggesting future research.
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Chapter 2
Conditional Nature of Rules Changes

Congressional scholars have paid special attention to how the U.S. Congress has evolved
over time. One group of these scholars has focused on explaining specific aspects of
Congress, including the emergence of political parties (Hoadley 1980; Holt 1992; Dawson 2000), standing committees (Gamm and Shepsle 1989), Senate leadership (Gamm and
Smith 2002a,b), and the filibuster (Binder and Smith 1997; Wawro and Schickler 2006).
Another group has focused on building a general theory of Congress, including the distributive perspective (Weingast and Marshall 1988), the conditional party government thesis (Rohde 1991; Aldrich 1995), the informational perspective (Krehbiel 1991), the party
cartel theory (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2005), and the pivotal politics thesis (Krehbiel
1998).
At the intersection of these rich research agendas, a prominent recent debate revolves
around why the House of Representatives has changed its rules regarding the majority rule
and the minority rights: Binder’s 1996 APSR article versus Schickler’s 2000 APSR article.
This debate is interesting not only because both authors try to understand the same facet of
Congress based on almost identical data, but also because their competing claims can be
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combined and resolved into a unified theory. If we use a more appropriate methodology,
we can determine the conditions under which each account best fits the historical record.
By proposing a new statistical model with a fresh set of factors, this paper argues that
rules changes are conditional in nature. In essence, I find strong evidence that different
combinations of political factors are required for different types of rules changes in the
House. In particular, the size and the homogeneity of the majority party are the main
factors for pro-majority changes. Additionally, the size of the majority party and the dimensionality of polity space are the keys for pro-minority changes.
I first explain rules changes could be conditional in nature. Then, I examine the previous statistical approaches to this subject and propose a more appropriate model. The
empirical analysis follows and the chapter concludes by restating my alternative theory of
the conditional nature in House rules changes.

2.1

Perspectives on Rules Changes

Under what conditions has the House changed its rules? One notable starting point is
a macro or organizational approach. Polsby (1968) and Cooper and Young (1989), for
example, argue that the institutional change in the U.S. Congress is a product of external
demands. As the role of the House grows, the floor agenda expands, and the time on
the chamber becomes more valuable, the House tends to limit individual members’ rights
and design effective procedural tools. The argument implies a monotonic reduction in
individual or minority rights over the long term.
A contrasting micro approach relies on an assumption that the institutional change reflects the aggregate outcome of individual members’ utility calculations. The party cartel
theory argues that the majority party, in general, dictates the procedures in the House, and
that, therefore, rules changes as well as rules themselves largely benefit the majority party
24

(Cox and McCubbins 1993, 1997). In addition, the majority party has exercised a negative
agenda control power, which effectively prevents unfavorable outcomes from being implemented on the floor (Cox and McCubbins 2005). Therefore, any institutional change is
necessarily a minor adjustment under the general pattern of majority party control over the
House.
However, there has been a historical variation in partisan control over the procedures.
For example, the conditional party government thesis (Rohde 1991; Aldrich 1995) is that
we observe a more centralized party control in the House as the majority party becomes
more cohesive and as the two parties become more distinct from each other. This implies
variation in individual and minority rights. Rules changes depend on the internal politics
within the majority party as well as on the inter-party polarization between the majority
and the minority parties.
With a slightly different focus, the disjointed pluralism perspective (Schickler and Rich
1997; Schickler 2001) provides that different interests are important for different periods
of time in determining the institutional change. Majority party interests have not entirely
dominated rules changes in Congress. Rather, there have been some other interests or
forces, such as cross-party coalitions, power-oriented individuals, and etc.
In line with this approach, Dion (1997) examines the strategic interaction between the
two parties. When the majority party becomes smaller, it tends to behave in a more cohesive
way. Consequently, the “frustrated” minority party is more likely to obstruct the process.1
As a result, the majority party needs rules changes that can possibly prevent obstructions
by the minority party.
A more direct debate on this subject occurs between Binder’s 1996 APSR article and
Schickler’s 2000 APSR article. Each of them traces two types of rules changes: creation
1

Dion uses three measures for the minority obstructions. But, only one of them - the number of missing
quorums - shows the conventional statistical significance at 5% level.
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and suppression of minority rights. They argue that there are pro-minority and pro-majority
changes, and test whether the majority party or the floor median has played an important
role in rules changes.
Binder (1996) emphasizes the partisan “capacity” of the majority party. The partisan
capacity means the relative strength of the party as compared with the opposition party.
Party strength usually consists of the size of the party (i.e., the number of members in
the party) and the cohesiveness of the party members: (1) a large majority party tends to
become stronger, and (2) cohesive party members are more likely to intensify the partisan
capacity.2 Her claim is that the stronger the majority party is relative to the minority party,
the more likely it is that the majority party will suppress minority rights. In addition, she
argues that the weaker the majority party is relative to the minority party, the more likely it
is that a cross-party coalition will create new minority rights.
In contrast, Schickler (2000) examines the role of the floor median, which is the crucial
factor in Krehbiel’s pivotal politics framework. Following the tradition of Downs (1957)
and Black (1958), the floor median, for the most part, captures the majoritarian nature of
congressional decision making. Schickler’s claim is that rules changes that advantage the
majority party are more likely when the floor median moves toward the majority party, and
that rules changes that reduce the majority party’s advantage are more likely when the floor
median moves away from the majority party (i.e., moves toward the minority party). The
upshot of his finding is that when the ideological balance component (i.e., the movement
of the floor median) is included in the multivariate model, the importance (as well as the
statistical significance) of Binder’s partisan capacity component substantially weakens.
Binder (2006) revisits the debate and tries to incorporate Schickler’s findings. Her
main contribution is to expand the data to all Congresses. She finds that her former claim
2

Binder (1996)’s theoretical expectation for the majority party size is the exactly opposite of Dion
(1997)’s. Later in the chapter, we will see whose expectations better comport with the data.
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on the suppression of minority party rights is still relevant for the longer time span, and
that the ideological balance by the floor median becomes significant only in the post-Reed
congresses. Therefore, she infers, different political forces affect the House rules changes
in different periods of time.3
When we see just the arguments and the evidence provided by the two scholars, we
are likely to conclude that, at least in the post-Reed Congresses, Schickler’s evidence is
stronger than Binder’s. But it is not that simple. First, key explanatory variables in their
models are highly correlated with each other, which requires us to investigate them in a
greater detail. Second, they use different statistical models and neither of their models is an
appropriate fit to both the theory and the data. By showing the above two points, I propose
a new theory on the conditional nature of rules changes in the House.

2.2

Conditional Nature of Rules Changes

My theory on the conditional nature of House rules changes builds upon the general agreement with the disjointed pluralism perspective: no single interest drives the institutional
change. Certainly, we must not simply assume that one factor explains two types of changes
at the same time. Rather, we have to empirically test whether or not there exist multiple
factors in promoting rules changes in the House when there are good theoretical reasons to
do so.
There are two main reasons why House rules changes could have a conditional nature.
First, the two types of rules changes that Binder and Schickler identify are fundamentally
different. Pro-majority changes largely favor the majority party leadership and the majority
party in general, but pro-minority changes are not exactly opposite to pro-majority changes.
3

Note that this is similar to the disjointed pluralism perspective.
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Pro-minority changes could be the changes that promote the rights of individual members,
certain committees, or the minority party in general. They could also benefit some groups
within the majority party or others across the two parties. While pro-majority changes are
mainly partisan changes, pro-minority changes are not necessarily partisan. It is possible
that different types of changes require different dynamics.
In this sense, I focus on the role of dimensionality in policy space. This actually comes
from an observation that pro-minority changes only occurred during a certain period: 19091967. This is a period when we had “explicit” cross-party coalitions in the House. They
include the progressive coalitions in the 1910s, the farm bloc in the 1920s, the New Deal
coalition in the 1930s, and the Conservative Coalition from the 1930s to the 1960s.
These groups voted together because they had common policy interests that were not
always aligned with the traditional liberal-conservative dimension. A frequent cross-party
voting alliance with common policy interests inevitably makes the policy space look twodimensional. And, under this two-dimensional regime, cross-party coalitions are more
likely to protect their own policy interests by promoting pro-minority changes. Twodimensional regime may not be a driving force per se, but pro-minority changes may occur
only when the House is two-dimensional. Therefore, a two-dimensional regime is a necessary condition for pro-minority changes, if not a sufficient condition.
Second, the key “driving force” for House rules changes that Binder and Schickler
stand for are actually composed of multiple sub-factors. Binder’s “Partisan Capacity” is
simple: it is defined as a composite of the size and the homogeneity of the majority party.
Schickler’s “Floor Median” is a little more complicated. Wiseman and Wright (2008) have
recently shown that the movement of the House median is mainly a function of two partisan
factors: the size and the homogeneity of the majority party.4 While these multiple sub4

The Technical Appendix at the end of this chapter shows empirical evidence for their argument (with my
data). Observe that the R2 there is very high (0.73).
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factors happen to be the same, different combinations in existence and/or strength of the
two sub-factors, along with the role of dimensionality, could influence different types of
rules changes.5
Moreover, we have good reasons to examine each component separately. The size and
the homogeneity of the majority party do not move together, as shown in Dion (1997).6
For example, when the size becomes smaller, the majority party tends to be more homogeneous. Under the expectations of both Binder (1996) and Wiseman and Wright (2008),
the two forces cancel with each other in influencing the direction of rules changes. So, if
we have only the multiplicative term,7 then it would be impossible to determine if it is size
or homogeneity that matters. To figure out which factor plays a more important role is,
therefore, a crucial task for understanding the dynamics of rules changes.
Consider the size of the majority party. Even though it has been ignored for a long
time by the general congressional organization literature,8 it has recently received some
attention (Smith 2007). According to him, the size of the majority party plays an important
role because, when pursuing a partisan goal, a large majority party would reduce the level
of sacrifice in both policy and electoral considerations. Therefore, with the same logic, a
large majority party can more likely afford to push pro-majority rules changes.9 And, this
would also apply to the two-dimensional regime because a really large majority can more
easily overcome the threats by cross-party coalitions.
5

Some might argue that this happened at random. However, the empirical correlation between “Partisan
Capacity” and “Floor Median” (with my data) is 0.72. This is not random, but systematic.
6

The empirical correlation between size and homogeneity (with my data) is -0.33.

7

In fact, the multiplicative term can be used only when one component is meaningless without the other
component (Brambor, Clark and Golder 2006, 68-69). And, this is not the case here.
8

The example includes the distributive perspective, the informational perspective, the conditional party
government thesis, the party cartel theory, and the pivotal politics framework.
9

Note that this is similar to Binder (1996), but is different from Dion (1997).
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In contrast, a small majority is vulnerable to cross-party coalitions if they want to pursue their own policy interests. Under the one-dimensional regime, a cross-party coalition
might not be enthusiastic enough to pursue pro-minority rules changes even when facing with a small majority. However, if the House is two-dimensional and if the majority
party becomes smaller in size, then a cross-party coalition is more likely to be enthusiastic
enough and powerful enough to promote pro-minority rules changes in order to guarantee
their own policy interests.
Next, consider the homogeneity of the majority party. In general, it is a major factor
that enables rank-and-file members to delegate greater authority to their leadership (Cooper
and Brady 1981; Rohde 1991; Aldrich 1995). In addition, the party cartel thesis puts its
emphasis on this factor when explaining the variation in positive agenda control by the
majority party (Cox and McCubbins 2005). Therefore, when the majority party becomes
more homogeneous, the party is more likely to change rules in its favor.
What is not certain is the role of heterogeneity. One can easily expect that a heterogenous majority party is more likely to drive pro-minority changes because the internal divisions are likely to produce cross-party cooperation. However, even though the majority
party becomes heterogeneous, there is no explicit reason why rank-and-file members must
and can withdraw their delegation from the leadership. A withdrawal of power is also
burdensome, and thus requires a solution to the problem of collective action. Therefore,
a heterogeneous majority party is expected to have little effect on promoting pro-minority
changes. And, if there is any effect, then it should be a limited mixed one.
In sum, I have three main hypotheses on the conditional nature of House rules changes:
• Hypothesis 1 [Conditional Nature]

Different combinations of factors are re-

quired for the two distinct types of rules changes.
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• Hypothesis 2 [Majority Size and Dimensionality]

Pro-majority changes are

more likely when the majority party becomes larger, regardless of dimensional regime
types. Pro-minority changes are more likely when the majority party becomes smaller,
especially under the two-dimensional regime.
• Hypothesis 3 [Majority Homogeneity]

Pro-majority changes are more likely

when the majority party becomes more homogeneous. Pro-minority changes have
little systematic relationship with heterogeneity of the majority party.
An alternative way to word these hypotheses is that (1) as for pro-majority rules changes,
the size and the homogeneity of the majority party are the main factors, and (2) as for prominority rules changes, the size of the majority party and the dimensionality of policy space
are the main factors.

2.3

Data and Methods

The unit of analysis for this paper is a single Congress. Since each Congress has a twoyear term, the data is biennial. The time period of analysis is 1867 to 1998, from the 40th
Congress to the 105th Congress (following Schickler’s choice), which provides sixty six
observations in total.
The outcome variable is rules changes for a given Congress (RULES). Out of 66 Congresses, 29 have exactly one type of rules changes affecting minority rights, 32 have no
rules change affecting minority rights. The remaining five Congresses10 have two types of
changes at the same time per Congress, one favoring the minority rights and one favoring
the majority party. A Congress is coded as -1 if there is only one type of rules changes
10
They are 44th, 46th, 52nd, 91st, and 103rd Congresses. Following Schickler’s coding, I treat these
changes as equivalent to no changes.
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Figure 2.1: House Rules Changes over Time

which promotes the minority rights, 1 if there is only one type of rules change which favors
the majority party, and 0 if (a) there is no change or (b) there are two countervailing rules
changes.11 There are 8 pro-minority changes (12.12%), 21 pro-majority changes (31.82%),
and 37 no or neutral changes (56.06%) The data come directly from Schickler (2000, Appendix A), and Figure 2.1 nicely shows the the distribution of outcome variable (RULES)
over time.12
11

Having only no change in this category does not produce a different conclusion

12
Different authors use slightly different version of the list. However, I simply follow Schickler’s list
in order to provide continuity. Because this variable is time-series data, there might be a concern about
the independence among observations. Moreover, in a substantive sense, rules changes inevitably suffer
from the path dependence (Binder 1997; Roberts and Smith 2007). However, it is crucial in maximum
likelihood estimation that the outcome variable is independent across observations. Without this property,
the log likelihood function cannot be easily constructed as usual. While there is no widely accepted test for
the time dependence of categorical outcomes, we can fit AR(1), · · · , AR(20) and U(1) models by treating the
outcome as continuous. Doing this reveals no evidence that the outcome variable has any time dependence.
Another application of the same data (Pang 2008) shows no serial correlation in errors to be corrected for
several categorical variable models. Even though it is not completely safe to assume pure independence, the
no-dependence assumption simplifies the subsequent analysis. Furthermore, both Binder and Schickler use
the maximum likelihood estimation. So, my assumption is not an exception.
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Table 2.1 demonstrates operationalization of all explanatory variables. “Partisan Capacity” (CAPT) and “Floor Median” (MED) are main explanatory variables for Binder and
Schickler. They are used mainly for replications and model comparisons. The key explanatory variables for my theory on the conditional nature of rules changes are “Majority Size”
(MAJPCT), “Majority Homogeneity” (HOM),13 and “Two-Dimension” (2DIM), corresponding
to the hypotheses above. And, two control variables - “Polarization” (POL) and “Republican Majority” (MAJ) - are also included. I collect the DW-NOMINATE data from Poole
and Rosenthal’s Voteview website14 and historical party division data from the Office of
the Clerk.15 These data were also used by Schickler (2000).
When estimating models and testing hypotheses, it is crucial to choose an appropriate
statistical model. Specifically, the model choices by Binder (1996, 2006) and Schickler
(2000) are actually not suitable for testing the first hypothesis raised above. This hypothesis
is about the conditional nature of House rules changes, which is the essence of this paper.
Binder uses two logit models.16 For analyzing the suppression of minority rights (i.e.,
pro-majority changes), her outcome variable is coded as 1 if there was a pro-majority
change and 0 otherwise. For analyzing the creation of minority rights (i.e., pro-minority
changes), her outcome variable is coded as 1 if there was a pro-minority change and 0
otherwise. The problem is with her outcome variable. By using a binary logit model to
13

Throughout this paper, the ideology measure is the first-dimensional DW-NOMINATE scores, estimated
by Poole and Rosenthal (1997). Of course, there are some limitations to the usage of DW-NOMINATE scores
to measure the ideology of congressional members. But, up to now, we do not have a better measure to avoid
the criticism. And, partisan aspects measured by using DW-NOMINATE scores are known to provide a good
fit to the observed behavior. So, in spite of the limitations, I rely upon DW-NOMINATE scores.
14

http://www.voteview.org/. Accessed on December 4, 2006.

15

http://clerk.house.gov/. Accessed on December 4, 2006.

16

In her original 1996 paper, she only uses one logit model for the suppression of minority rights. For the
creation of minority rights, she simply compares descriptive statistics, where she finds the same evidence for
her partisan theory. However, in her 2006 paper, she tries two models for both rules changes.
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Table 2.1: Operationalization of Variables

Explanatory Variables
Majority Capacity*
Floor Median*
Majority Size*
Majority Homogeneity*
Two-Dimension
Polarization*
Republican Majority

CAPT
MED
MAJPCT
HOM
2DIM
POL
MAJ

Notations
MAJPCT
MINPCT
MAJSD**
MINSD**
ALLSD**
FLMED
MAJMED
MINMED
MPRE ***

Measurement
MAJPCT × (1/MAJSD) − MINPCT × (1/MINSD)
| FLMED − MINMED | − | FLMED − MAJMED |
% of seats held by the majority party
(1/MAJSD) ÷ (1/ALLSD)
1 if MPRE > 0.25 and 0 otherwise
| MAJMED − MINMED |
1 if the Republican Party is the majority party and 0 otherwise
Meaning
% of seats held by the majority party
% of seats held by the minority party
standard deviation of majority party members’ first-dimensional
DW-NOMINATE scores
standard deviation of minority party members’ first-dimensional
DW-NOMINATE scores
standard deviation of all House members’ first-dimensional DWNOMINATE scores
median of all House members’ first-dimensional DWNOMINATE scores
median of majority party members’ first-dimensional DWNOMINATE scores
median of minority party members’ first-dimensional DWNOMINATE
scores
Pq
( j=1 [errors by 1-dim model − errors by 2-dim model]j )
Pq
÷( j=1 [errors by 1-dimensional model]j ), j = roll call vote

* When estimating models, “difference” measures of the variables are used (indicated by “d” at front).
** 1/sd because large standard deviation means less homogeneity (Aldrich, Berger and Rohde 2002).
*** MPRE captures the relative importance of the 2nd dimension as compared to the 1st dimension. It was
first introduced by Poole and Rosenthal (1997) and revised by Roberts, Smith and Haptonstahl (2008).
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measure pro-majority changes, Binder treats all pro-minority changes as no change - or,
does not differentiate pro-minority changes from no change. Neither her theory nor our
conventional wisdom provide a rationale for this. The same problem arises when she analyzes pro-minority changes. She treats all pro-majority changes as no change. Figure 2.2
(a) depicts her choice of outcome variable. Because of this decision, Binder might estimate her interested changes incorrectly. We simply need to have a three-category outcome
variable.
Schickler’s model uses a three-category outcome variable. However, his outcome variable is ordered from pro-minority changes (y = −1) to pro-majority changes (y = 1)
with no changes in the middle (y = 0). Therefore, the coefficients from his ordered logit
model tell us the effect of explanatory variables when we move the outcome variable from
pro-minority changes (y = −1) all the way up to pro-majority changes (y = 1). The coefficients do not explicitly tell us the effect of explanatory variables on the change of the
outcome variable from no change (y = 0) to pro-minority changes (y = −1) or from no
change (y = 0) to pro-majority changes (y = 1).17 Another way of saying this is that
the ordered logit model cannot distinguish “what drives pro-minority changes” from “what
drives pro-majority changes.” Even though the model detects the importance of certain
coefficients, there is no way to figure out which direction of rules changes (pro-majority
or pro-minority changes) is caused by that explanatory variable. Figure 2.2 (b) illustrates
Schickler’s treatment of the outcome variable and the statistical model.
Therefore, the ordered logit model becomes problematic if, in reality, different types
of explanatory variables cause different directions of rules changes. This situation is illustrated in Figure 2.2 (c). The status quo point is “no change.” A certain factor leads to a
17

This suggests that, unless a certain assumption is satisfied, the interpretation of coefficients from the ordered logit model might lead to a false conclusion. In the later section, I present the test of parallel regression
assumption, after which it becomes more obvious why the ordered logit model is inappropriate.
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(a) Binder (1996, 2006)

(b) Schickler (2000)

(c) Theoretical Interest

Figure 2.2: Drawbacks of Previous Model Choices
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pro-minority change (factor A), and another leads to a pro-majority change (factor B). It
could be the case that factor A and factor B are not the same one, and that the effects by
factors A and B are not symmetric in their magnitude. Therefore, if we theoretically and
substantively want to examine what makes the rules changes from no change (y = 0) to
pro-majority changes (y = 1) and/or the rules changes from no change (y = 0) to prominority changes (y = −1), then the ordered model would not be an appropriate test of
this theoretical claim.
Instead, I propose to use a multinomial logit model with “no change” as the base category. The multinomial logit model basically estimates two logit models where the first
model includes only pro-majority changes and no change (excluding pro-minority changes)
and the second model includes only pro-minority changes and no change (excluding promajority changes).18 If we adopt the multinomial logit model, then we are able to test
whether or not the factors A and B, in Figure 2.2 (c), are different.

2.4

Empirical Analysis

The first step is to verify that my arguments are driven not by the data but by the model
choice. Hence, I conduct replications of both Binder’s and Schickler’s models as well
as my alternative model. Table 2.2 (a) is a replication of two logit models of Binder.19
Partisan Capacity (dCAPT) is always statistically significant across models with expected
signs. Both in making pro-majority changes and in allowing pro-minority changes, the
partisan capacity of the majority party is a driving force. Table 2.2 (b) is a replication of
18
The difference between two logits and multinomial logit is that the latter estimates parameters in a more
efficient way (Long 1997).
19

In order to control for the effect of the conditional party government thesis, the models could have
included variables such as dHOM and dPOL. But, due to the multicolinearity problem (condition number of
x0 x > 100), I intentionally exclude them.
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ordered logit model of Schickler.20 Floor Median (dMED) is always statistically significant
across models with expected signs, and, equally importantly, Partisan Capacity (dCAPT)
becomes not significant as argued in Schickler (2000).
Another important finding is that an alternative multinomial logit model in Table 2.2
(c) produces an interesting pattern that we could not observe from the above two models:
no explanatory variable of interest is statistically significant across all outcomes. Rather,
one and only one explanatory variable shows statistical significance in each direction of
rules changes, and different explanatory variables are important for different types of rules
changes.21 Therefore, a first look at the data and the preliminary statistical results show
that the multinomial logit model is theoretically appealing, and that the first hypothesis on
the conditional nature of rules changes appears to be true, at least in a naive sense.
A different approach to examine why the ordered logit model fails to capture this “conditional pattern” is to conduct a statistical test for the “parallel regression (PR)” assumption
of the ordered logit model.22 In the language of Figure 2.2 (c), this PR assumption means
that, given the factors A and B being the same, the effects toward the two different directions should be the same. If this assumption holds, we are free to use the ordered logit
model of Figure 2.2 (b) and there might not exist the conditional nature in rules changes.
However, as Table 2.3 shows, the two most important explanatory variables do not seem to
fully satisfy the PR assumption. The two coefficients for Floor Median (dMED) are very dif20

Schickler (2000) presents multiple models with several collections of explanatory variables. Among
others, I choose to show two important models: one testing against Binder (1996) and the other testing
against the conditional party government (CPG) thesis. Throughout the discussion in this paper, however, the
former is a main focus. One more thing to note is that the model could have included all variables at the same
time. But, due to the multicolinearity problem (conditional number of x0 x > 100), I intentionally choose two
separate models.
21

Note that statistical significance or non-significance is largely determined by large or small coefficient
values, not by small or large standard-error values.
22

The Technical Appendix shows a more rigorous and detailed analysis on this.
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Table 2.2: Replications and Alternative Model
(a) Binder (1996, 2006): Two Logit Models
Model 1: Pro-Majority Changes† Model 2: Pro-Minority Changes††
Coefficient Std.error z-value Coefficient Std.error
z-value
Partisan Capacity: dCAPT
0.9897
0.3193
3.10
-0.8968
0.3450
-2.60
Republican Majority: MAJ
-1.2645
0.7130
-1.77
0.9705
0.8493
1.14
constant
-0.4545
0.3674
-1.24
-2.9241
0.7029
-4.16
N
65
65
AIC
72.696
45.834
Note: † Outcome variable is 1 if pro-majority changes and 0 otherwise. †† Outcome variable is 1 if
pro-minority changes and 0 otherwise.
(b) Schickler (2000): Ordered Logit Models
Model 3: Against Binder†
Coefficient Std.error z-value
5.0826
2.5310
2.01
0.5429
0.2907
1.87

Model 4: Against CPG†
Coefficient Std.error z-value
8.6630
2.1417
4.04

Floor Median: dMED
Partisan Capacity: dCAPT
Majority Homogeneity: dHOM
0.8372
0.4960
1.69
Polarization: dPOL
4.7132
7.9311
0.59
Republican Majority: MAJ
-1.0942
0.5752
-1.90
-1.1063
0.5993
-1.85
intercept 1 | 2
-3.1503
0.6024
-5.23
-3.1719
0.6109
-5.19
intercept 2 | 3
0.5709
0.3657
1.56
0.6097
0.3712
1.64
N
65
65
AIC
109.889
110.362
Note: † Outcome variable is -1 if pro-minority changes, 0 if no change (or neutral changes), and 1 if
pro-majority changes.
(c) Alternative: Multinomial Logit Model
Model 5†
Pro-Minority Changes
Coefficient Std.error z-value
-12.5724
5.0311
-2.50
-0.0049
0.4788
-0.01
0.6616
1.0105
0.65
-3.1358
0.9958
-3.15

Floor Median: dMED
Partisan Capacity: dCAPT
Republican Majority: MAJ
constant
N
AIC
†
The base category is “No Change”.

Pro-Majority Changes
Coefficient Std.error z-value
0.2643
3.1302
0.08
0.8696
0.4158
2.09
-1.1372
0.7179
-1.58
-0.3727
0.3771
-0.99

65
111.0709
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Table 2.3: Test of Parallel Regression Assumption
Coefficients from
j-1 binary regressions
Wald Test
Variables
y ≤ −1
y≤0
χ2
p > χ2
Floor Median: dMED
12.8641
1.2445 4.59
0.032
Partisan Capacity: dCAPT
0.1371
0.8754 1.62
0.203
Republican Majority: MAJ -0.8266
-1.2261 0.12
0.732
constant
3.5963
-0.4739
Note: This result is based on Model 3 in Table 2.2 (b).

df
1
1
1

ferent from each other (12.8641 vs. 1.2445), producing the Wald statistic of 4.59 (p = 0.03).
The two coefficients for Partisan Capacity (dCAPT) are substantively different (0.1371 vs.
0.8754) even though statistically indistinguishable (Wald statistic of 1.62 with p = 0.20).
Therefore, the two explanatory variables - Partisan Capacity (dCAPT) and Floor Median
(dMED) - do not explain different rules changes in an equal weight.
The next step is to fully examine the conditional nature of House rules changes with
the three hypotheses that I construct in the previous sections. The first hypothesis is about
the conditional nature of rules changes: different combinations of factors are required for
the two different types of rules changes. In order to test this hypothesis, I employ the
multinomial logit model with “no change” as the base category. The second hypothesis
is about the combined effect of the majority party size (Majority Size: dMAJPCT) and the
dimensionality (Two-Dimension: 2DIM). To test this hypothesis, I include the interaction
terms, and calculate a new set of coefficients and standard errors, following the suggestion
of Brambor, Clark and Golder (2006). As for the third hypothesis on the role of the majority
party homogeneity, I include Majority Homogeneity (dHOM) as a plain term. Finally, the
possible effects of the inter-party polarization (Polarization: dPOL) and the Republican
majority status (Republican Majority: MAJ) are controlled in the multivariate analysis.
Table 2.4 summarizes the results. Model 6 includes only plain terms and Model 7
includes interactions terms as well. First and foremost, three key explanatory variables of
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Table 2.4: Multinomial Logit Model: Conditional Nature of Rules Changes
Model 6†

Majority Homogeneity: dHOM
Majority Size: dMAJPCT
Two-Dimension: 2DIM
Polarization: dPOL
Republican Majority: MAJ
constant
N
AIC

Pro-Minority Changes
Coefficient Std.error z-value
-1.5016
1.1893
-1.26
-0.1783
0.0683
-2.61
2.4982
1.3985
1.79
6.8416 15.9854
0.43
1.1576
1.0968
1.06
-4.7419
1.6861
-2.81

Pro-Majority Changes
Coefficient Std.error z-value
2.0717
0.8953
2.31
0.1475
0.0573
2.57
0.2042
0.6887
0.30
6.7625
9.2006
0.74
-1.2430
0.7673
-1.62
-0.5759
0.5677
-1.01

65
117.3293
Model 7†
Pro-Minority Changes
Pro-Majority Changes
Coefficient Std.error z-value Coefficient Std.error z-value
-0.9267
0.9488
-0.98
2.2544
0.9716
2.32
-0.0199
0.1153
-0.17
0.2483
0.1069
2.32

Majority Homogeneity: dHOM
Majority Size: dMAJPCT††
under 1-dim regime (2DIM=0)
Majority Size: dMAJPCT††
-0.2158
0.0802
-2.69
0.1195
0.0596
under 2-dim regime (2DIM=1)
Polarization: dPOL
5.0518 15.5504
0.32
5.0819
9.6673
Republican Majority: MAJ
1.1322
1.1025
1.03
-1.3292
0.7989
constant
-2.7619
0.8809
-3.14
-0.3161
0.3969
N
65
AIC
118.4374
†
The base category is “No Change”.
††
Calculated by the author based on the interaction model (Brambor, Clark and Golder 2006).
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2.01
0.53
-1.66
-0.80

our interest have made selective influence on the two different types of rules changes. As
for pro-majority changes, the size and the homogeneity of the majority party are shown to
be main factors (dMAJPCT and dHOM). As for pro-minority changes, the size of the majority
party and the dimensionality of policy space are shown to be main factors (dMAJPCT and
2DIM). The first hypothesis is confirmed with the data: there is a conditional nature in
House rules changes.23
The effects of Majority Size (dMAJPCT), in particular, depend on the dimensionality.
Only under the two-dimensional regime, a small majority promotes pro-minority changes
(coefficient of -0.2158 with z-value of -2.69). However, it has little effect on pro-minority
changes if it is under the one-dimensional regime (coefficient of -.0199 with z-value of 0.17; observe a huge difference in size between two coefficients). On the other hand, a large
majority has significant influence on making pro-majority changes under both dimensional
regimes. The net effect is a little larger under the one-dimensional regime (coefficient of
0.2483 with z-value of 2.32) than under the two-dimensional regime (coefficient of 0.1195
with z-value of 2.01). However, experiencing the two-dimensional regime does not fully
prevent a large majority from implementing their preferred rules changes.
Majority Homogeneity (dHOM) has a selective effect on rules changes. A more homogeneous majority party is more likely to implement pro-majority changes (coefficient of
2.2544 with z-value of 2.32). Heterogeneity of the majority party has less effect on promoting pro-minority changes (coefficient of -0.9267 with z-value of -0.98). Therefore, the
second and the third hypothesis are confirmed.
Figure 2.3 provides a more vivid depiction of how certain variables influence rules
changes. The first plot shows the probability of having two types of rules changes when
23

For the completeness of argument, I have also employed the ordered logit model with the same explanatory variables here, and then tested the PR assumption of the model (results omitted here). As expected, all
three key variables do not appear to fully satisfy the PR assumption.
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Figure 2.3: Predicted Probabilities of Two Types of Rules Changes
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Majority Homogeneity (dHOM) varies from its observed minimum to its observed maximum, holding other variables at their means. Starting from 0 on the horizontal axis,24 the
movement to the right direction significantly increases the probability of having a promajority change. On the other hand, the movement to the left direction somewhat increases
the probability of having pro-minority changes even though the probability itself does not
fully reach to the level over 0.6.
The second plot shows the probabilities of having two types of rules changes when
Majority Size (dMAJPCT) varies from its observed minimum to its observed maximum,
holding other variables at their means (except for 2DIM). The predicted probabilities under
the two different dimensional regimes are shown in different lines: solid line for the onedimensional regime and dotted line for the two-dimensional regime.
Starting from 0 on the horizontal axis, the movement to the right direction notably
increases the probability of having a pro-majority change (almost unconditional on dimensional regime types). The effect under the two-dimensional regime looks linear while the
effect under the one-dimensional regime looks more imminent. More interestingly, the
movement to the left direction produces an distinct pattern. A smaller majority significantly increases the probability of having pro-minority changes under the two-dimensional
regime, whereas it has almost no effect under the one-dimensional regime.

2.5

Conclusion

By finding a more appropriate statistical model and a more reasonable set of explanatory
variables, I find rules changes in the House to be conditional in nature. Different combinations of political factors are required for the two different types of rules changes. As
24
This is because the explanatory variables of interest are difference measures. The exactly same explanation holds for the other graph on the bottom.
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for pro-majority changes, the size and the homogeneity of the majority party are the main
factors, whereas the size of the majority party and the dimensionality of policy space are
the main factors for pro-minority changes.
To put it differently, two partisan forces selectively influence rules changes. First, the
majority size matters in combination with dimensionality. Pro-minority changes are more
likely when the majority party becomes smaller, especially under the two-dimensional
regime. Pro-majority changes are more likely when the majority party becomes larger,
regardless of dimensional regime types. Second, the majority homogeneity has a mixed
effect. Pro-majority changes are more likely when the majority party becomes more homogeneous. Pro-minority changes have little systematic relationship with heterogeneity of
the majority party.
This finding consequently questions the role of floor median in rules changes. As nicely
summarized by the term “ideological power balance,” the floor median has been considered
as a key player in the House to balance the power between the majority and the minority
parties: “the median voter on the floor has been free to unite with members of either party
to enact new rules” (Schickler 2000, 283). To the contarary, the finding in this chapter
strongly suggest that the power of floor median is very much dependent on both partisan
factors and policy dimensions.
It looks as if the floor median’s move drove a certain rule change. However, what really
happens could be that some partisan factors affect both the movement of floor median and
the change in House rules at the same time. Then, it would be more appropriate to say that
rules changes in the House are driven by several partisan forces, not by the floor median.
Moreover, an explicit role of dimensionality in rules changes seriously undermines the role
of floor median, especially for pro-minority changes.
While this paper is successful in discovering the conditional nature of rules changes, it
also suffers from some limitations. I do not include rules changes in the party caucus for the
45

analysis while they could significantly affect congressional organizations and congressional
politics. Moreover, I do not consider the magnitude of rules changes even though some
changes could be more important than others. I leave these for future research.
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2.6
2.6.1

Technical Appendix
Statistical Comparison of Models

There are three statistical criteria in order to compare logit vs. ordered logit vs. multinomial
logit models. They include: 1) the parallel regression (PR) assumption for the ordered logit
model; 2) the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption for the multinomial
logit model; and 3) the percent of correctly predicted outcomes for each model (i.e. how
well the models recover the data).
First, consider the parallel regression (PR) assumption for the ordered logit model. The
ordered logit model has one implicit assumption: the coefficients should be the same when
we compare binary cumulations. Formally speaking, it assumes:
∂Pr(y ≤ 0|x)
∂Pr(y ≤ 1|x)
∂Pr(y ≤ −1|x)
=
=
∂x
∂x
∂x
where y is outcome variable and x is a vector of explanatory variables.
If this assumption is violated, we cannot use the ordered model and we must consider
alternative models - multinomial models (Long 1997). The easiest way to test the PR
assumption is to run multiple cumulative logit models, and check whether the coefficients
for each explanatory variable are identical by using the Wald test. The Wald statistic is
constructed by

WPR = (Rβ̂ R −

∗
β̂ F )0

h
i−1
∗
0
d
RVAR(β̂ R )R
(Rβ̂ R − β̂ F )

∼a

χ2df

where R is a matrix indicating the restriction, β̂ R is a vector of coefficients from the cumu∗

d β̂ R ) is
lative logit model, β̂ F is a vector of coefficients from the ordered logit model, VAR(
a variance-covariance matrix from the cumulative logit model.
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Table 2.5: Comparison of Models
(a) Test of Parallel Regression Assumption
Coefficients from
j-1 binary regressions
Wald Test
Variables
y ≤ −1
y≤0
χ2
p > χ2
Floor Median: dMED
12.8641
1.2445 4.59
0.032
Partisan Capacity: dCAPT
0.1371
0.8754 1.62
0.203
Republican Majority: MAJ -0.8266
-1.2261 0.12
0.732
constant
3.5963
-0.4739
Note: This result is based on Model 3 in Table 2.2 (b).

df
1
1
1

(b) Test of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives
Pro-minority changes
Pro-majority changes
Coefficient
Coefficient
full
pro-maj difference
full
pro-min
difference
mlogit
excluded
mlogit excluded
Floor Median: dMED
-12.5724 -11.6590
0.9134
0.2643
0.8802
0.6159
Partisan Capacity: dCAPT
-0.0049
-0.0397
0.0348
0.8696
0.8312
0.0384
Republican Majority: MAJ
0.6616
0.5638
0.0978
-1.1372 -1.2189
0.0817
constant
-3.1358
-3.0497
0.0861
-0.3727 -0.3540
0.0187
Hausman test
χ2 (6) = 0.046
χ2 (6) = −0.410†
Prob > χ2 = 0.9999
Prob > χ2 = 0.9999
†
Note: This result is based on Model 5 in Table 2.2 (c). According to Long (1997), Hausman and McFadden
examined negative values, and concluded that a negative value is evidence that IIA holds.
(c-1) Percent Correctly Predicted - Logit vs. Multinomial Logit
Pro-minority changes Pro-minority changes
logit†
mlogit†††
logit††
mlogit†††
Numbers correctly predicted
57
61
50
51
Percent correctly predicted
86.36
92.42
75.76
77.27
Percent reduction of errors
44.44
6.25
Note: † Based on Model 1 in Table 2.2 (a). †† Based on Model 2 in Table 2.2 (a). ††† Based on
Model 5 in Table 2.2 (c).
(c-2) Percent Correctly Predicted - Ordered Logit vs. Multinomial Logit
ologit†
41
62.12

mlogit††
Numbers correctly predicted
45
Percent correctly predicted
68.18
Percent reduction of errors
16.00
Note: † Based on Model 3 in Table 2.2 (b). †† Based on Model 5 in Table 2.2 (c).
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Table 2.5 (a) shows the result from binary cumulations based on Model 3 in Table 2.2
(b) (Schickler’s ordered logit). Notably, the two most important explanatory variables do
not seem to fully satisfy the PR assumption. The two coefficients for Floor Median (dMED)
are very different from each other (12.8641 vs. 1.2445), producing the Wald statistic of 4.59
(p = 0.03). The two coefficients for Partisan Capacity (dCAPT) are substantively different
(0.1371 vs. 0.8754) even though statistically indistinguishable (Wald statistic of 1.62 with
p = 0.20).
Secondly, we can test the assumption of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA)
for the multinomial logit model. The IIA assumption simply means that the odds (the probability of having one alternative as opposed to another alternative) are determined without
reference to other outcomes that might be available25 . So, IIA requires that if a new alternative becomes available, then all probabilities for outcomes should adjust so that the
original odds among all pairs of outcomes remain the same. If we see this in a different
angle, the IIA assumption also requires that omitting one alternative should not affect the
values of coefficients. Formally speaking, it is:
Pr(y = m|x)
Pr(y = n|x)

=
Y

Pr(y = m|x)
Pr(y = n|x)

, ∀ distinct m, n, l ∈ Y
Y−{l}

where m, n, l ∈ Y are three-category outcomes.
If this assumption is violated, we cannot use the multinomial logit model and we must
consider alternative models - such as a multinomial probit (Long 1997)26 . The most com25

It is important to note that this statement is a conditional statement (i.e. conditional on x). Since the
outcome variable y is modeled by a set of explanatory variables (x), the technical meaning of this statement
might not be exactly the same as written here.
26

In this sense, the IIA assumption is for multinomial logit models, not multinomial models in general.
And, it is also important to note that even the failure of the IIA assumption does NOT indicate that we have to
use the ordered logit model. Just in case, I’ve also run the multinomial probit model (in a Bayesian framework
with uniform priors). And, the result is very similar to Table 2.2 (c).
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monly used method to test the IIA assumption is the Hausman test. We need to first run
multiple binary/multinomial logit models where one or more outcome categories are excluded. Then, the Hausman statistic can be used to check whether the coefficients for the
restricted model are inconsistent with the coefficients for the full model. The Hausman
statistic is constructed by

HIIA = (β̂ R −

∗
β̂ F )0

h

c β̂ R ) − Var(
c β̂ F )
Var(

i−1

∗

(β̂ R − β̂ F )

∼a

χ2#rows in β̂

R

∗

where β̂ R is a vector of coefficients from the restricted binary/multinomial model, β̂ F is
c β̂ R ) and Var(
c β̂ F ) are
a vector of coefficients from the full multinomial model, and Var(
variance-covariance matrices from the restricted and the full multinomial model respectively.
Table 2.5 (b) shows the result from the restricted models based on Model 5 in Table 2.2
(c) (my multinomial logit model). Notably, there is no evidence that the IIA assumption
is violated: Hausman tests for both alternatives produces the p-values of almost 1.0 (p =
0.9999)27 .
Thirdly, a comparison of “the percent of outcomes correctly predicted” is another way
to compare models. This is a concept of how well a constructed statistical model can
generate observed data based on its estimated result. If one model is found to generates the
data more accurately than another model, then the data is considered to have a “better fit”
to the first model. I conduct two comparisons: Binder’s two logits versus my multinomial
logit, and Schickler’s ordered logit versus my multinomial logit.
To compare my model to Binder’s model, the predicted values are calculated as:
27

Of course, failure to reject the null of IIA using the Hausman test does not necessarily mean that IIA
holds in a statistical sense. However, the similarity between my multinomial logit result and an alternative
multinomial probit result weakly suggests that the IIA assumption is satisfied at least in a substantive sense.
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• Logit (Binder)


 1 if Pr(yi = −1 | pro-minority model) > 0.5
Pro-minority predicted =
 0 otherwise



 1 if Pr(yi = 1 | pro-majority model) > 0.5
Pro-majority predicted =

 0 otherwise
• My multinomial logit

Pro-minority predicted =



 1 if Pr(yi = −1) is the largest


 0 otherwise


 1 if Pr(yi = 1) is the largest
Pro-majority predicted =

 0 otherwise
And, in order to compare my model to Schickler’s model, the predicted values are calculated as:
• Ordered logit (Schickler)



−1 if Pr(yi = −1) is the largest



Predicted =
1
if Pr(yi = 1) is the largest




 0
otherwise
• My multinomial logit



−1 if Pr(yi = −1) is the largest



Predicted =
1
if Pr(yi = 1) is the largest




 0
otherwise
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As Table 2.5 (c-1) indicates, the multinomial logit model predicts the outcome better
than the binary logit model. My multinomial logit model correctly predicts 92.42% of prominority changes whereas Binder’s logit model correctly predicts 86.36% of pro-minority
changes. And, my multinominal logit model correctly predicts 77.27% of pro-majority
changes while Binder’s logit model correctly predicts 75.76% of pro-majority changes. So,
the percent reduction of errors (PRE) in favor of my multinomial logit model (as compared
to Binder’s binary logit models) is 44.44% for pro-minority changes and 6.25% for promajority changes.
Similarly, Table 2.5 (c-2) shows that the multinomial logit model also predicts the
outcome better than the ordered logit model. My multinomial logit model correctly predicts 68.18% of the rules changes while Schickler’s ordered logit model correctly predicts
62.12% of the rules changes. So, percent reduction of errors (PRE) in favor of my multinomial logit model (as compared to Schickler’s ordered logit model) is 16%. In sum, a
multinomial logit model performs better than either logit or ordered logit models.
A more vivid way to see the appropriateness of my multinomial logit model is to examine the biased estimates produced by other models. In general, if an outcome variable
is indeed ordinal and a multinomial model is used, then we have a loss of efficiency (while
still having unbiasedness). However, if we have a nominal outcome variable and an ordered
model is employed, then we have biased estimates (Long 1997)28 . Figure 2.4 shows how
much biased Binder’s and Schickler’s estimates are as compared to my multinomial logit
model when predicting the probability of having a certain type of rules change.
Figures 2.4 (a) and 2.4 (b) plot the probabilities of having pro-majority changes and prominority changes when Partisan Capacity varies from its observed minimum to its observed
28

Of course, the unbiasedness of estimates depends on multiple factors such as model choice, functional
form, and all relevant covariates. So, if we follow a strict criteria, then every estimate is biased and useless. I
am not making this extreme of an argument. Rather, even after assuming that all other factors are perfect, the
wrong choice of an ordered logit produces biased estimates.
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Figure 2.4: How Biased are Logit and Ordered Logit?
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0.4

maximum, holding other variables at their means. In (a), the slope from the multinomial
logit model is similar to that from the logit model and steeper than that from the ordered
logit model. This suggests that the effect of Partisan Capacity on pro-majority changes is
under-estimated in the ordered logit model. On the other hand, in (b), the slope from the
multinomial logit model is much less steep than that from the logit model and that from the
ordered logit model. This suggests that both logit and ordered logit models over-estimate
the effect of Partisan Capacity on pro-minority changes.
Figures 2.4 (c) and 2.4 (d) plot the probabilities of having pro-majority changes and
pro-minority changes when Floor Median varies from its observed minimum to its observed
maximum, holding other variables at their means. In (c), the slope from the ordered logit
model is much steeper than that from the multinomial model, indicating that the effect of
Floor Median on pro-majority changes is over-estimated in the ordered logit model. On
the other hand, in (d), the slope from the ordered logit model is less steep than that from
the multinomial logit model, suggesting that the effect of Floor Median on pro-minority
changes is under-estimated in the ordered logit model.
In sum, Binder’s binary logit model over-estimates the effect of Partisan Capacity on
pro-minority changes, but is fairly accurate for estimating the effect of Partisan Capacity
on pro-majority changes. Schickler’s ordered logit model under-estimates the effect of
Partisan Capacity on pro-majority changes and the effect of Floor Median on pro-minority
changes, while over-estimating the effect of Partisan Capacity on pro-minority changes and
the effect of Floor Median on pro-majority changes.
The methodological lesson is that, if there is any question about the ordinal nature
of the outcome variable (especially in a theoretical sense), we need to give up efficiency
in order to avoid potential bias. The fact that the values of the outcome variable can be
ordered does not imply that the variable should be analyzed as ordered. Here, there is
no theoretical evidence that the outcome variable is strictly ordered: the category of “no
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Table 2.6: Partisan Capacity and Floor Median Variables
Model A1†
Outcome Variable
Partisan Capacity: dCAPT
Coefficient Std.error z-value
Majority Homogeneity: dHOM
1.5504
0.1074
14.44
Majority Size: dMAJPCT
0.1547
0.0075
20.54
Republican Majority: MAJ
0.2395
0.1254
1.91
constant
-0.1023
0.0767
-1.34
R2
0.8929
Residual standard error
0.4752 on 62 df
F -statistic
172.4 on 3-62 df (p < 0.01)
Note: † A simple OLS is employed.

Model A2†
Floor Median: dMED
Coefficient Std.error z-value
0.0775
0.0188
4.12
0.0172
0.0013
13.02
0.0143
0.0220
0.65
0.0036
0.0134
-0.27
0.7340
0.0833 on 62 df
57.02 on 3-62 df (p < 0.01)

change” contains only five neutral changes (7.56% of all cases and 14.51% of no change
cases). More importantly, if we are interested in the conditions that affect pro-majority or
pro-minority changes as compared to no change, it is safe to use the multinomial model. It
is particularly so here, given that Schickler’s ordered logit violates the PR assumption and
my multinomial logit does not violate the IIA assumption.

2.6.2

Partisan Capacity and Floor Median Variables

Table 2.6 shows how well the two partisan sub-factors - Majority Size (dMAJPCT) and
Majority Homogeneity (dHOM) - explain both Partisan Capacity (dCAPT) and Floor Median
(dMED). Observe the very high R2 values for both models. This makes sense in that we
have an extremely high level of correlation between Partisan Capacity and Floor Median
variables (0.72).
Methodologically speaking, the high correlation between Partisan Capacity and Floor
Median variables is problematic because it causes a possible multicolinearity problem.
When I replicated Schickler’s model and compared that with the alternative model, I intentionally included both variables in the same model. Since this level of multicolinearity
still guarantees BLUE (Greene 2003; Cameron and Trivedi 2005), my previous discus-
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sion about “change” and “bias” in coefficients still holds. However, we have a way to fix
the multicolinearity by excluding both Partisan Capacity (dCAPT) and Floor Median (dMED)
and by including both Majority Homogeneity (dHOM) and Majority Size (dMAJPCT) instead.
This could serve for an another reason why I choose an alternative list of explanatory variables in the paper.

2.6.3

MPRE

MPRE12 refers to the marginal proportional reduction in errors from the 1-dimensional
DW-NOMINATE model to the 2-dimensional DW-NOMINATE model. It is a measure
to calculate the relative importance of the second dimension as compared to the first dimension. It was originally introduced by Poole and Rosenthal (1997), and was revised by
Roberts, Smith and Haptonstahl (2008)29 . It is calculated as:
Pq

j=1

MPRE12 ≡
=

[errors by 1-dimensional model − errors by 2-dimensional model]j
Pq
j=1 [errors by 1-dimensional model]j

(1 − APRE1 ) − (1 − APRE2 )
,
(1 − APRE1 )

where APREk ≡

Pq

j=1 [minority

vote - classification errors]j ÷

Pq

j=1 [minority

vote]j , cal-

culated for the k-dimensional model.
As shown in Figure 2.5, the period of 1909-1967 (blocked by the two vertical lines) is
characterized by a higher level of MPRE’s. It increases from 0.15 to 0.30 in 1909, stays
around there until 1968, and declines in subsequent periods. The period of cross-party
coalitions was actually a two-dimensional regime.

29

Poole and Rowenthasl’s original measure is APRE2 − APRE1 . However, according to Roberts, Smith
and Haptonstahl (2008), this actually measures how much the 2-dimensional model improves on the 0dimensional model than the 1-dimensional model does. Therefore, MPRE12 is an appropriate way to calculate the relative importance of the second dimension as compared to the first dimension.
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Chapter 3
Minority Party Members on Committees

Political parties and standing committees are the two most important organizations in almost every national legislature in the world. Committees are the center of legislative and
investigative activities, and are often interpreted as a tool to promote partisan goals. Political parties and their leaders try to influence committees by assigning members, regulating
tasks, resources and committee personnel, reviewing committee decisions, and controlling
access to the floor (Cox and McCubbins 1993). One thing that appears to prevent more
complete control of committees is the presence of members of the other party.
Why would a generic parliament have committees with minority party members? In
other words, why does the majority party tolerate minority party members on committees?
In most parliamentary settings, if the majority party considers minority party committee
members a burden, then it could choose to exclude minority party members entirely from
the committee system. This, however, has rarely happened in history. What benefits do
minority party members on committees provide to the majority party on the floor? This
chapter provides one possible explanation to this question via a simple signaling game.
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I argue that, in equilibrium, the majority party on the floor has an incentive to include
minority party members on committees. Specifically, the majority party can extract informational benefits by having minority party members on committees. This is an informational rationale for the presence of minority party members on committees. Without relying
on normative arguments or a repeated game framework, I show that the majority party can
expect to be better off by having minority party members on committees.
After discussing the uniqueness of my approach to examine this ironic situation, I develop a signaling model game, where the majority party is the principal and committee
delegations are the agents. Then, the chapter concludes by discussing theoretical extensions and possible applications.

3.1

How to Approach the Question

Some have just assumed that the majority party cannot exclude minority party members
from the committee system. They usually justify this assumption with normative rationales,
such as upholding democratic values, preserving institutional legitimacy, or defending minority rights. For example, minority party members and their constituents would feel much
more “democratic” when they are included in the decision-making process. Supporters and
voters for the minority party would have higher political efficacy when their representatives
are actively participating in the policy-making process.
While these rationales are a very important part of the story, my approach differs in that
I do not rely on normative motivations for political actors. Rather, I assume a high level of
utilitarianism for all legislators, allowing each legislator to choose an option based on costbenefit calculations. If the majority party came to the conclusion that it would be better off
without minority party members on committees, and if it were actually able to implement
that, then it should be able to choose an option of restricting minority party members from
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the committee system. My model allows this type of decision by endogenizing the majority
party’s choice between a majoritarian or a bipartisan committee system.
My approach also differs from the logic of “repeated games.” The goal here is to eliminate or reduce the social inefficiency observed in the equilibria of games such as the prisoner’s dilemma game (Fudenberg and Maskin 1986; Calvert 1995). Under the repeated
game, a player can be deterred from obtaining short-term gain by the threat of punishment that reduces long-term benefits. Applying the method here, for example, consider a
hypothetical committee system which does not allow minority party members. The majority party knows it might lose majority status in some future election, after which it could
reasonably be concerned with being excluded from the committee system. In this case,
perhaps it is regular elections that prevent the current majority party from employing such
an extreme, even “nuclear” option.
On the other hand, I seek a rationale that involves narrow self-interest not only in the
long run but also in the short run. I model committee output as a signaling game with a
structure that is widely used in contract theory (Laffont and Martimort 2002; Salanie 2005).
Under the signaling game, certain information is known to one person but not to another . In
order to overcome this informational asymmetry, the less-informed person (principal) hires
the well-informed person (agent). Under the contract, the well-informed person provides
the less-informed person with a useful tip regarding the information of interest. This tip
is called a “signal.” Since the two person’s preferences are not identical, the signal itself
might not be as trustworthy as one can naively imagine. Therefore, increasing the quality
of the signal is the main goal for the less-informed person.
In my approach, committee delegations from both the majority and the minority party
send signals while the majority party in the parent chamber receives them. There is no
difference in cost for different signals, so my model is a “cheap talk” game. Even though
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the signals are cheap, the majority party can be better off by having two signals from the
committee rather than just one.
The basic components of the signaling game come from multiple sources. First, the
idea of having two signals comes from Grossman and Helpman (2001). They explore the
benefit of having multiple lobbysts with contrasting biases. Legislators can be better if
they have two lobbyists with “opposite bias” than if they have either one lobbyist or two
lobbyists with “like bias.” I apply this logic to the committee composition problem: the
majority party may be better off if it has two committee delegations with “opposite bias.”
Secondly, most of the game settings that I use here benefit from a line of research on
“rules” choices (Gilligan and Krehbiel 1987, 1989; Krishna and Morgan 2001). While
they derive several equilibria that are my starting points, the research questions from this
literature are fundamentally different from mine. They are interested in why a legislature
adopts rules that limit amendments whereas I am interested in why the majority party wants
minority party members in the committee system. However, as will be clear later, their
game settings provide some clues about how I can address my own question.
While borrowing from prior literature, my model extends previous studies in two key
ways: I endogenize the committee composition decision inside the game sequence, and
I allow variations in the bias of minority party members in the committee. These two
improvements actually are crucial when deriving my conclusion about the committee composition decision by the majority party on the floor.
There are several other distinctive features of my model that, though not necessary
for deriving my conclusion, are worth mentioning. First, if we consider the model in a
principal-agent framework, my principal is the majority party on the floor whereas my predecessors consider the parent chamber (as a whole) as principal. Second, my equilibrium
is weakly preferred by each of the players in the game over my predecessors’ equilibria.
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Third, the utility functions in my model are “absolute value” loss functions whereas those
in my predecessors are quadratic loss functions.

3.2

Model

There are three players in the game: (1) Cmaj denotes the majority party delegation to the
committee; (2) Cmin denotes the minority party delegation to the committee; and (3) Lmaj
denotes the majority party leadership representing the party caucus (or the majority party on
the floor). Each is modeled as a unitary actor who cares about a unidimensional outcome
x ∈ X ⊂ R.1 The ideal point of Lmaj is set equal to 0 without loss of generality. The
ideal point of Cmaj is c (> 0) and that of Cmin is −rc (r > 1).2 All players use absolute
value loss functions to evaluate actual outcomes: for an outcome, x, (1) ULmaj = −|x|; (2)
UCmaj = −|c − x|; and (3) UCmin = −| − rc − x|.
The committee proposes a bill, b ∈ P ⊂ R, and the floor then chooses a policy, p ∈
P ⊂ R. The policy p results in an uncertain outcome, x = p + ω, that depends on some
underlying state of nature ω ∈ U[0, 1]. And, there is an exogenously given status quo
policy, po (−1 < po < 0).
The sequence of the game is as follows:
1. Lmaj chooses either Majoritarian Committee System (committee only with Cmaj ) or
Bipartisan Committee System (committee with both Cmaj and Cmin ).

1

I make the unidimensionality assumption not because I think the House is unidimensional as Poole and
Rosenthal (1997) argue, but because the majority party leadership (Lmaj ) generally cares mostly about the
liberal-conservative dimension.
2

r represents the variance on Cmin ’s ideal point. This is actually an innovation in a modeling sense. More
specifically, r is assumed to be greater than 1, which means that Cmin is ideologically more distant from Lmaj
than Cmaj is.
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2. Nature reveals the state ω to Cmaj and Cmin , but not to Lmaj .3
3. Cmaj proposes a bill b ∈ P and Cmin makes a public speech s ∈ [0, 1] about ω at the
same time.
4. Lmaj chooses a policy p ∈ {b, po }.4
5. Utility is realized to each player.
Since Lmaj chooses how to construct the committee first, the entire game can be analyzed by focusing on two subgames separately: Bipartisan Committee System subgame
versus Majoritarian Committee System subgame. Then, based on the expected utilities
from each subgame’s equilibrium, we can derive the conditions where Lmaj chooses the
Bipartisan Committee System (the system that the House has maintained).
A strategy b(ω) for Cmaj specifies a bill to propose for each state of nature. A strategy
s(ω) for Cmin specifies a public speech given the observed state of nature. A strategy for
Lmaj , p(b, s), specifies a feasible policy after observing b(ω) and s(ω). Finally, Lmaj forms
posterior beliefs g(b, s) over the state space. For each subgame, strategies and beliefs


b∗ (ω), s∗ (ω), p∗ (b, s), g ∗ (b, s)

comprise a weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium (wPBE) if
1. Lmaj selects p∗ (b, s) that maximizes expected payoffs given g ∗ (b, s);
2. Cmaj and Cmin simultaneously choose b∗ (ω) and s∗ (ω), respectively, to maximize
payoffs given p∗ (b, s); and
3

This is a situation of information asymmetry. So, Lmaj “hires” Cmaj and Cmin as its agents.

4

This represents the closed rule. The open rule case is illustrated in the Technical Appendix.
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3. the beliefs g ∗ (b, s) are formed using Bayes’s rule, wherever possible.5
In an intuitive sense, what I want to do is to specify a set of strategies for all players so that the majority party leadership (Lmaj ) can guarantee a better outcome under the
Bipartisan Committee System as compared with the Majoritarian Committee System. In
other words, under a certain specification of strategies, I show that the minority committee
delegation (Cmin ) helps the majority party leadership (Lmaj ) enjoy a better outcome.

3.3

Equilibria

Subgame I: Majoritarian Committee System
In the first Majoritarian Committee System subgame , the wPBE is:



−ω + c if ω ≤ −3c − po





 4c + po if − 3c − po < ω < −c − po
∗
b (ω) =


po
if − c − po ≤ ω < c − po





 −ω + c if ω ≥ c − p
o


 po if b ∈ (po , 4c + po )
∗
p (b) =

 b otherwise



−po
if b ∈ (po , 4c + po )





 U[−3c − po , −c − po ] if b = 4c + po
∗
g (b) =


U[−c − po , c − po ]
if b = po





 c−b
otherwise
and EULmaj (Majoritarian Subgame) = −c

5

I do not consider beliefs off the equilibrium path, hence the solution concept is “weak” PBE.
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Figure 3.1: wPBE of Majoritarian Committee System subgame
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Figure 3.1 illustrates the equilibrium result of this subgame. The horizontal axis represents the level of uncertainty, ω. The vertical axis represents the proposed policy, b(ω), and
the realized policy outcome, x. The dotted line of b∗ (ω) is the equilibrium bill proposal by
Cmaj and the solid line of x∗ is the equilibrium outcome. For example, if Cmaj observes an
ω value, say (−3c − po ), then she proposes a bill of (4c + po ). Consequently, the policy is
realized as c. Note also that c is Cmaj ’s ideal point and 0 is Lmaj ’s ideal point.
First, with only Cmaj on the committee, Lmaj should, in equilibrium, always defer to the
committee proposal due to the lack of information. Consequently, the final outcome is a
little away from Lmaj ’s ideal point (0) and Cmaj can enjoy a situation, from time to time,
under which its ideal point (c) is a final policy consequence. As we will see shortly, this is
not the case if the committee is composed of both Cmaj and Cmin .
Second, in the perspective of Lmaj , it can have more preferable policy outcomes if it
allocates Cmaj with smaller c. When I set up the model, the location of Cmaj is exogenously
given. However, if Lmaj , for some reasons, is able to control this exogenously-given location,6 then Lmaj can expect more favorable policy outcomes. In other words, the majority
party leadership can control the committee activities by having members who are ideologically similar to the party leadership (or the party caucus). In order for future comparison, I
would like to call this “direct” control: the majority party leadership controls the committees by directly controlling the membership of the committee delegations.

Subgame II: Bipartisan Committee System
In this subgame, Cmaj and Cmin simultaneously choose a bill b and a speech s, respectively.
Then, based on b and s, Lmaj chooses a policy p ∈ {b, po }. Before describing the equilibrium result, I borrow the concept of “agree/disagree” from Krishna and Morgan (2001).
6

This is usually done through the committee assignment process.
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Given a bill b and a speech s, the two committee delegations are said to agree if there exists an ω such that b = b∗ (ω) and s ⊆ s∗ (ω). If there is no such ω, then the committee
delegations are said to disagree. Another way to think about “agree/disagree” is as “consistent/inconsistent” (with each other). When Lmaj observes b, it can construct a set of possible
ω values. Based on this set of possible ω values, Lmaj can think of a set of possible s values.
If the observed s value is one of the hypothetically constructed s values, then Lmaj would
consider that b and s are consistent, or that Cmaj and Cmin agree.
In the second Bipartisan Committee System subgame, the wPBE is:7

b∗ (ω) =




−ω
if ω ≤ −2rc − po






−2ω − 2rc − po if − 2rc − po < ω ≤ −rc − po



po





−2ω + 2c − po





 −ω

if − rc − po < ω ≤ c − po

if c − po < ω ≤ 2c − po
if ω > 2c − po

s∗ (ω) = − b∗ (ω)


 b if Cmaj and Cmin agree
∗
p (b, s) =

 po otherwise


 −b if Cmaj and Cmin agree
∗
g (b, s) =

 −po otherwise

and EULmaj (Bipartisan Subgame) = −r2 c2 − c2

7
It is very important to note that the expression s∗ (ω) = −b∗ (ω) does not mean Cmin follows Cmaj ’s strategy. Cmaj and Cmin choose their strategies simultaneously. This expression only means that, in equilibrium,
two players’ strategies have this relationship.

67

Figure 3.2: wPBE of Bipartisan Committee System subgame
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Figure 3.2 illustrates an equilibrium for the Bipartisan Committee System subgame. As
in the previous subgame, the figure shows the equilibrium bill proposal b∗ (ω) (dotted line)
and its outcome x∗ (solid line), depending on the level of uncertainty.
Similar to the Majoritarian Committee System subgame, Lmaj always defers to the committee in equilibrium due to the lack of information. However, the policy consequences do
not please the bill proposer (Cmaj ) as much as in the Majoritarian Committee System subgame. Lmaj can achieve its own ideal outcome (0) when ω ∈ (0, −2rc − po ) ∪ (2c − po , 1).
This could not have happened were it not for the presence of Cmin . If we use the language of
the principal-agent framework, the principal (Lmaj ) could extract more valuable information
from the “primary” agent (Cmaj ) with the help of the “secondary” agent (Cmin ).
In other regions, final policy consequences please Cmin more than others when ω ∈
(−2rc − po , −po ) and please Cmaj more than others when ω ∈ (−p0 , 2c − po ). These ∨shaped and ∧-shaped regions are required in order to make Cmin and Cmaj indifferent from
the status quo, respectively. This can be thought of as a price to pay for two things: (1) delegating a bill proposal authority to Cmaj in order to overcome the informational asymmetry;
and (2) utilizing the presence of Cmin in order to more fully control Cmaj .
In this subgame, Lmaj does not explicitly change the ideal point of Cmaj . However, I
show that, with some help of Cmin , Lmaj can induce Cmaj to change their bill proposal in
favor of Lmaj . This happens because, in addition to the bill proposal by Cmaj , Lmaj allows
Cmin to speak about the policy uncertainty. In essence, Lmaj employs a strategy profile under
which Lmaj passes the committee proposal only when the two signals from the committee
(the bill proposal and the speech) point to the same thing, and reject it otherwise. This
consequently forces Cmaj to moderate the bill proposal in order to have Cmin on board. In
order to distinguish this mechanism from the previous one, I would like to call this “indirect” control: the majority party leadership controls their committee delegations indirectly
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by allowing minority party members to signal.

When is the Bipartisan Committee System better?
Since we have the wPBE results from the two subgames, we can move on to the initial
sequence of the entire game. Here, Lmaj has to choose either to construct the Majoritarian
Committee System with only Cmaj or to construct the Bipartisan Committee System with
both Cmaj and Cmin .

PROPOSITION.

At the first stage of the game (committee contruction stage), in

order for Lmaj to have (or prefer) the Bipartisan Committee System instead of the Majoriq
tarian Committee System, the condition 1 ≤ r ≤ 1−c
should hold.
c

Figure 3.3 compares wPBE’s from the two subgames. The proposition can be easily
derived by comparing the expected utilities from each subgame. The proposition has two
implications. First, if Lmaj has no option but to choose the Bipartisan Committee System
instead of the Majoritarian Committee System, or if it is inclined to have indirect controls
rather than direct controls, then it must (1) have Cmaj who satisfies the condition in the
proposition, and (2) make use of Cmin ’s signal in order to control Cmaj . To put it differently,
if the above condition holds, the majority party leadership can profitably utilize the indirect
control mechanism.
Second, we can derive a quasi negative relationship between c and r. As r becomes
smaller, the possible range that c can have becomes larger. As r becomes larger, the possible range of c becomes smaller. In other words, if the minority party delegation on the
committee are ideologically distant from the majority party’s party caucus, the majority
party leadership should assign members from their own party who are ideologically very
similar to the party caucus. If the minority party delegation on the committee is instead ide70

Figure 3.3: Policy Outcomes from Equilibriums of Signaling Game
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ologically close to the majority party’s party caucus, then the majority party leadership can
allow the existence of ideologically dissimilar members on the committee assigned from
their own party.

3.4

Discussion

By using a signaling model, I show that the majority party has an incentive to include
minority party members on committees. This contrasts with my initial supposition that
minority members on committees might be a burden to the majority party. Although the
minority party delegation does not have any bill proposal power in my model, it constrains
the majority party delegation in a way that serves the majority party in general. This effect
stems from the fact that the minority party delegation makes a public speech about the state
of nature. This provides an informational rationale for why the majority party chooses to
have minority party members on committees.
Therefore, it is possible to say that my approach is a combination of the partisan perspective of Cox and McCubbins (1993) and the informational perspective of Krehbiel
(1991). I adopt the partisan perspective because my primary concern is the relationship
between the majority party leadership and the majority party committee delegations. I also
adopt the informational perspective because committees are supposed to provide an expertise on policies so my focus is on the informational role of minority party committee
delegations.
A better way to understand the implications of the model is to consider possible extensions. Such possibilities include examining the role of medians (both floor and committee
medians), the role of status quo locations, and additional signaling activities within the majority party.

72

Role of Medians
Committee proposals require votes in the full committee. As such, the pivotal player could
be the committee median, not the majority party committee delegation. My signaling
model, however, does not include the committee voting stage after the committee proposal
(by the majority). The question is whether the substantive conclusion will be different if
we consider this element. In short, not likely.
When there is sincere voting on the committee, the bill proposal should reflect the
committee median. It is up to the majority party leadership to decide whether or not it
allows public “speech” by some members in the committee. Consider three cases: (1)
the committee median is the only player - no additional activity; (2) in addition to the
committee median, either the majority party or the minority party delegation is allowed to
make a public speech about the state of nature; and (3) along with the committee median,
both the majority party and the minority party delegations are allowed a public speech.
First, if the majority party leadership does not allow any “speech” other than the bill
proposal (by the committee median), then the equilibrium result would be very similar to
my Majoritarian Committee System subgame, except that the point, c, will change to wherever the committee median is located. The implication from this new game’s equilibrium
is similar. The majority party leadership should rely fully on the committee median, and it
has a burden to control the committee median directly. Or, it needs to allow public speech
by someone else on the committee.
Second, the majority party leadership allows one speech from either party’s committee
delegation. Here, the equilibrium result will be biased toward the member who makes a
speech. If the speech is from the same side of the committee median, then this speech does
not help the majority party leadership. On the other hand, if the speech is from the opposite
side of the committee median, then the speech can help the majority party leadership to
enjoy more favorable outcomes.
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Third, the majority party leadership allows speeches from both parties’ committee delegations. Then, the equilibrium becomes similar to my Bipartisan Committee System subgame. With the two additional signals, the majority party leadership can be better off.
The bottom line is that the majority party leadership needs at least one additional signal
from the committee. Unless the committee median and the majority delegation are located
on opposite sides, the majority party leadership would like to have the minority party delegation on the committee. In that way, the leadership can enjoy the benefit that my signaling
model demonstrates.
Another consideration is the median on the floor. Of course, the floor median would
also prefer the minority representation in committees because the floor median is more
likely to be located between the two parties’ medians. However, my signaling model considers a possibly extreme situation where the majority party dictates everything on the floor.
Even under this extremely majoritarian system, I argue that the majority party leadership
has an incentive to have minority party members on committees.

Signaling Within Majority Party
It is obvious that multiple signals from opposite directions are good. But, what if the
majority party leadership receives one signal from the mainstream committee member and
another signal from the moderate committee member?8 Because both of them are from
the same same party, the leadership can easily control them. In short, this could be a very
reasonable extension of my signaling logic to a slightly different substantive problem.
We can consider a possible game in which a mainstream committee member proposes
a bill, and a moderate committee member makes a public speech about the policy uncertainty. Other components remain the same as before. The first subgame is the committee
8

A moderate member is defined as one whose ideology is similar to minority party members.
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system with only the mainstream member, and the second subgame is the one with both
the mainstream and the moderate members. The wPBE of each subgame are very similar,
except that the ∨-shaped region becomes narrower and the ∧-shaped region becomes wider
in Figure 3.2.9 Finally, the conclusion follows that the majority party leadership benefits
from their moderate members’ signals.
This is a very plausible story about the committee assignment process. From time to
time, the majority party leadership has to confront two dilemmas: (1) how to effectively
control extreme committee outliers within their own party, and (2) what to do with committee assignment requests made by moderate members. Having both outliers and moderate
members together in the committee system could be a reasonable solution.
A potential problem would occur when there is no committee assignment request from
the moderate side and all committee members are on the same side of the majority party
leadership. Then, the leadership could be worse off: it needs another mechanism. On the
other hand, the minority party members could be a safe choice for the membership of the
opposite side (as compared to moderate members from their own party). In other words,
the majority party leadership has an incentive to include minority party members in the
committee system at least under certain conditions.

Role of Status Quo
My model currently assumes that the status quo (po ) be negative and far away from 0. But,
we can think of a situation where the status quo point approaches toward 0 (i.e., the ideal
point of Lmaj ). Then, the ∨-shaped and the ∧-shaped regions would become narrower. This
is so because these two regions are to make Cmaj and Cmin indifferent from the status quo.
9

The mainstream member would be a little more extreme than the party median on the committee, and
the moderate member would be closer to the party leadership than the minority party member.
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In one perspective, this scenario is good for the majority leadership (Lmaj ): the equilibrium outcome becomes more closer to its ideal point. However, in another perspective,
it becomes less appealing for the majority leadership to have the minority party members
on committees: the value of minority presence on committees depends on the location of
status quo.

Applications
Although the signaling model itself is neither committee-specific nor time-specific, the
real world story could depend on several factors. For example, my signaling model logic
works better for some committees but not for others. Consider a situation where the majority party leadership wants a “direct” and “complete” control over the committees that
oversee interests crucial to the party. The leadership is more likely to deliberately choose
their committee delegations in a way that committee delegations are ideologically similar
and partisanly loyal to the party caucus. It does not matter if there exist minority party
members on the committee: it might not be the leadership’s interest to consider this factor. These committees would include Rules, Appropriations, Ways and Means, and Budget
Committees in the U.S. House of Representatives.
Another consideration is that not all committees are entirely relevant to the interest of
party and its leadership. For example, the Agriculture Committee does not always produce policy outcomes that the party leadership would care about. In other words, they are
involved in multi-dimensional policy outcomes. Then, we might not be able to observe
control activities at all. Therefore, my signaling model would work better for committees
such as Foreign Affairs, Education and Labor, Judiciary, Banking, and others in the House.
Similarly, my signaling model would be more applicable for the “textbook Congress”
period. Consider a situation where the chamber is very polarized between the majority and
the minority parties. As we observe from time to time, the minority party could come up
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with a strategy under which their party members simply object to whatever the majority
does. This might occur for electoral considerations rather than policy purposes. If the
electoral dimension is the primary paradigm for legislators, then my signaling model, which
considers only policy motivations, would not work in a consistent way. Therefore, a less
polarized period such as the mid-twentieth century would fit my signaling model better.

3.5

Conclusion

This chapter is a theoretical exercise to better understand the somewhat ironical situation: why does the majority party bother to have minority party members on committees? I
set up a signaling model and provide an informational rationale. Minority party committee
delegations induce majority party committee delegations to moderate their bill proposal
so that the majority party leadership can enjoy a better policy outcome. Put differently,
the majority party leadership does not have a strong incentive to eliminate the minority
representation on committees.
The uniqueness of my approach is to focus only on short-term utilitarian perspective.
I do not deny that normative considerations could be one of the most important factors. I
simply want to add one more story in which even an extreme narrow self-interest does not
preclude us from having our current system of bipartisan committees. An obvious next step
for future research is to examine how this works in real parliamentary institutions.
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3.6
3.6.1

Technical Appendix
Proof of Equilibria

Majoritarian Committee System subgame
Observe that the beliefs are consistent with Bayes’s rule wherever possible. So, it suffices
to show that, given beliefs, no player has an incentive to deviate from the equilibrium
strategies. Recall that the policy space, X, is a line where the ideal point of Lmaj is the
origin. Depending on the location of the status quo, po , there are four cases.
(i) po + ω ≤ −3c (i.e. ω ≤ −3c − po ): In this case, the equilibrium strategies result
in an outcome of c (the ideal outcome for Cmaj ). Since Cmaj can get the best outcome from
b∗ (ω), it has no incentive to deviate. By the same token, since Lmaj prefers b∗ (ω) to po given
its beliefs, it also has no incentive to deviate.
(ii) −3c < po + ω < −c (i.e. −3c − po < ω < −c − po ): In this case, the equilibrium
strategies result in an outcome of po + ω + c. Since Cmaj prefers b∗ (ω) to po , it has no
incentive to deviate. On the other hand, given beliefs, Lmaj would have the same expected
payoff from deviating to po . So, Lmaj doesn’t have a strong incentive to deviate.
(iii) −c ≤ po + ω < c (i.e. −c − po ≤ ω < c − po ): In this case, the equilibrium
strategies result in an outcome of po + ω (the status quo outcome). Since both Lmaj and Cmaj
are indifferent between b∗ (ω) and po , neither has a strong incentive to deviate.
(iv) po + ω ≥ c (i.e. ω ≥ c − po ): Same as in the case (i), the equilibrium strategies
result in an outcome of c (the ideal outcome for Cmaj ). By the same reasoning, neither Lmaj
nor Cmaj has an incentive to deviate.
Finally, using Figiure 3.1, it is trivial to calculate the expected utility of Lmaj from this
subgame, which is −c.
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Bipartisan Committee System subgame
Observe that Lmaj is always optimizing, given its beliefs, and that the beliefs are consistent
with Bayes’s rule along the equilibrium path. So, it suffices to show that both Cmaj and
Cmin has no incentive to deviate from the equilibrium strategies. One thing to note is that
the deviation by either player leads to b 6= −s, which ultimately results in the status quo
outcome. With the same logic as in Majoritarian Committee System subgame, there are
five cases depending on the location of the status quo, po .
(i) po + ω ≤ −2rc (i.e. ω ≤ −2rc − po ): In this case, the equilibrium strategies result
in an outcome of 0 (the ideal outcome for Lmaj ). Since both Cmaj and Cmin prefer b∗ (ω) to
po , neither has an incentive to deviate.
(ii) −2rc < po + ω ≤ −rc (i.e. −2rc − po < ω ≤ −rc − po ): The equilibrium strategies
result in an outcome of −2rc − po − ω. Since Cmaj prefers b∗ (ω) to po , it has no incentive
to deviate. And, since b∗ (ω) satisfies the condition (b + ω) − (−rc) = (−rc) − (po + ω),
Cmin is indifferent between b∗ (ω) and po . So, it has no strong incentive to deviate.
(iii) −rc < po + ω ≤ c (i.e. −rc − po < ω ≤ c − po ): The equilibrium strategies result
in an outcome of po + ω (the status quo outcome). So, both Cmaj and Cmin are indifferent
between b∗ (ω) and po , which means neither player has a strong incentive to deviate.
(iv) c < po + ω ≤ 2c (i.e. c − po < ω ≤ 2c − po ): The equilibrium strategies result in an
outcome of 2c − po − ω. Since Cmin prefers b∗ (ω) to po , it has no incentive to deviate. And,
since b∗ (ω) satisfies the condition (po + ω) − c = c − (b + ω), Cmaj is indifferent between
b∗ (ω) and po . So Cmaj has no strong incentive to deviate.
(v) po + ω > 2c (i.e. ω > 2c − po ): As in the case (i), the equilibrium strategies result
in an outcome of 0 (the ideal outcome for Lmaj ). Since both Cmaj and Cmin prefer b∗ (ω) to
po , neither has an incentive to deviate.
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Finally, using Figure 3.2, it is trivial to calculate the expected utility of Lmaj from this
subgame, which is −(rc × rc + c × c) = −r2 c2 − c2 .

Proposition
When EULmaj (Bipartisan subgame) ≥ EULmaj (Majoritarian subgame), the Bipartisan Committee System is preferable for Lmaj to the Majoritarian Committee System. Since the expected utilities are EULmaj (Majoritarian subgame) = −c and EULmaj (Bipartisan subgame) =
−r2 c2 − c2 , and since r is assumed be greater than 1, the condition −c > −r2 c2 − c2 should
q
yields the wPBE of the Bipartisan
hold. This provides that the condition 1 ≤ r ≤ 1−c
c
Committee System subgame as the equilibrium outcome of the entire game.

3.6.2

Open Rule Game

The open rule case is simpler than the closed rule case: the Bipartisan Committee System
(with both Cmaj and Cmin ) is always better for the majority leadership (Lmaj ) than the Majoritarian Committee System (with only Cmaj ).
Majoritarian Committee System subgame
In this subgame, Cmaj proposes b and Lmaj chooses any policy p ∈ P after observing b.
Therefore the wPBE is:
b∗ (ω) ∈ [c − ai+1 , c + ai ] if ω ∈ [ai , ai+1 ]



− aN −12+aN if b < c − 1



p∗ (b) =
− ai +a2 i+1
if b ∈ [c − ai+1 , c + ai ]




 − a0 +a1
if b > c
2
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(a) wPBE of Majoritarian subgame

(b) wPBE of Bipartisan subgame

Figure 3.4: The Open Rule Game: Two Subgames
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U [aN −1 , aN ] if b < c − 1



g ∗ (b) =
U [ai , ai+1 ]
if b ∈ [c − ai+1 , c + ai ]




 U [a0 , a1 ]
if b > c
where a0 = 0, ai = a1 i + 2i(1 − i)c, aN = 1, and N is the largest integer such that
|2N (1 − N )c| < 1.

[PROOF]

This is exactly Crawford and Sobel (1982)’s “information transmission” equi-

librium. See (Gilligan and Krehbiel 1987, 309-312) for more details. Figure 3.4 (a) illustrates the equilibrium result of this subgame.

Bipartisan Committee System subgame
Here, Cmaj and Cmin simultaneously choose a bill b and a speech s, respectively. Then,
based on the observed values of b and s, Lmaj chooses any policy p ∈ P . The wPBE is:
b∗ (ω) = −ω


 −2rc
∗
s (ω) =

 2rc



b














b+s
∗
p (b, s) =















 p
o

if ω ≤ 1 − 2rc
if ω > 1 − 2rc
if
or if

Cmaj & Cmin agree
Cmaj & Cmin disagree and
b, b + s ∈ [−1, 0] and UCmin (s) > UCmin (0)

if

Cmaj & Cmin disagree and
b, b + s ∈ [−1, 0] and UCmin (s) ≤ UCmin (0)
Cmaj & Cmin disagree and
b, b + s 6∈ [−1, 0]

or if

otherwise

g ∗ (b, s) = −p∗ (b, s)
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Figure 3.5: The Open Rule Game: Entire Game

[Proof]

This is exactly Krishna and Morgan (2001)’s “heterogeneous committee” equi-

librium under open rule. See (Krishna and Morgan 2001, 438-440, 448) for more details.
Figure 3.4 (b) illustrates the equilibrium result of this subgame.

When is the Bipartisan Committee System better?
The expected utility from the Bipartisan Committee System subgame is larger than that
from the Majoritarian Committee System subgame, because the former produces 0 expected utility, whereas the latter produces a clearly negative utility. Figure 3.5 demonstrates this visually. Therefore, in the open rule case, a bipartisan committee system is
always preferred by the floor majority over a majoritarian committee system.
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Chapter 4
Special Rules and Dimensionality

One of the most challenging moments while studying the American Congress is to observe
the depth of disagreements in generalizing the same phenomenon. Several theories are
competing, different methods are developing, and new data are emerging. All look like a
fierce battlefield. However, in another sense, this is why we, as congressional scholars, are
successfully accumulating knowledge, theories, and data.
Subjects such as political parties, special rules, and dimensionality all belong to this
type of embattled subfield in American congressional politics. Each of the three topics has
received rigorous attention for a long period of time, and has established a good record of
scholarly works. However, the interactions in between are a little vague. While they are
necessarily all inter-related, little attention has been explicitly given to these relationships.
This chapter, therefore, aims to build upon three groups of literature, and provides an
answer for one particular research question. What are the determinants of dimensionality?
In short, this paper is one of the first attempts to assess a variation in dimensionality for
individual bills by paying special attention to the partisan use of restrictive rules.
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I first derive predictions in conjunction with different perspectives of legislative organizations: distributive, informational, and partisan. Then, I conduct an empirical test on
the relevance of each perspective in explaining the relationship between special rules and
dimensionality. It turns out that the partisan perspective provides us with the most reasonable rationale with desirable evidence. The evidence suggests that political parties are
intentionally reducing dimensionality of individual bills by using restrictive special rules
with an expectation that this generates “easy” floor coalitions with a “clear” and “not-ugly”
party brand name.

4.1

Perspectives on Dimensionality

Since the prominent work of Poole and Rosenthal (1997), congressional scholars have been
treating - or, at least, assuming - policy space in Congress as unidimensional. Their logic is
simple and powerful: it is difficult to make a substantial improvement in predictive power
by adding more dimensions upon a simple liberal-conservative dimension. As such, most
significant recent theoretical frameworks in congressional politics are based on this unidimensional world (Krehbiel 1998; Epstein and O’Halloran 1999; Cameron 2000; Howell
2003; Cox and McCubbins 2005).
However, going back to MacRae (1958) and Clausen (1973), there has always been a
traditional approach that assumes a multidimensional policy space. Their logic is also very
simple and powerful: congressional voting alignments vary as we move from one policy
area to another. In addition, even within one policy area such as agriculture, a combination
of different dimensional interests play an important role (Jones 1961; Hurwitz, Moiles and
Rohde 2001).
Recently, there have been some very promising attempts to resolve this discrepancy between the unidimensional and the multidimensional characterizations of the congressional
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policy space. For example, Crespin and Rohde (2007) examine all roll call votes on appropriations bills from the 100th through the 107th Congress. They first group all votes by
13 issue types, and then analyze voting patterns within each category. They find that some
issues are multidimensional and that members do not always vote in a consistent way on all
votes. According to them, the liberal-conservative dimension is present in almost all issue
areas whereas other dimensions are too sparse across issues. Consequently, if aggregated to
one Congress, such as in Poole and Rosenthal (1997), non liberal-conservative dimensions
do not have enough roll call votes to reveal multidimensionality.
Roberts, Smith and Haptonstahl (2008) move a little further to examine the dimensionality by various levels of aggregation. By analyzing roll call votes for the 1955-1994
period, they first find that the dominance of the first liberal-conservative dimension varies
over time and across issues: the importance of the first dimension increases over time, and
votes on agriculture and civil rights issues do not align with votes on most other issues.
Moreover, when the aggregation level becomes lower, down to the individual bill level, the
policy space recovered from roll call votes becomes indeed multidimensional. Therefore,
similar to Crespin and Rohde (2007), they conclude that the unidimensionality is “largely
an artifact of the estimation process aggregated to the two-year Congress” (Roberts, Smith
and Haptonstahl 2008, 6).
A slightly different approach is to examine different stages of the policy making process: from the policy proposal stage, through the final passage voting stage, and to the
policy implementation stage. Talbert and Potoski (2002) show that the policy space is multidimensional if we analyze the cosponsorship data, but that it becomes unidimensional if
we have final passage voting data. Potoski and Talbert (2000) additionally show that the
policy space once again becomes multidimensional if we use data on federal distributive
policy awards (to congressional districts). In general, they argue that the dimensionality is
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reduced during the floor stage when the actual policy space of legislators’ preferences is
multidimensional.
While these are all meaningful findings by themselves, what is missing is a more systematic analysis on the determinants of dimensionality. At every level of aggregation, there
is a variation in dimensionality to be explained. In particular, individual bills are subject
to a careful examination because most spatial theory accounts of Congress are based on an
assumption in unidimensionality at the bill level. This chapter aims to assess the determinants of this variation in dimensionality by focusing on the role of restrictive special rules
in the House of Representatives.

4.2

Perspectives on Restrictive Special Rules

Restrictive special rules have been considered one of the most important features of agenda
control in the contemporary U.S. House. During the textbook era, special rules functioned
as a “traffic cop” (Sinclair 1995, 139). Since the postreform era, they have been increasingly reducing uncertainty and enhancing legislative efficiency (Bach and Smith 1988).
From time to time, they served the interests of the majority party (Smith 1989; Sinclair
1995), and sometimes promoted special interests for the conservative coalition (Schickler
and Pearson 2009).
The major perspectives on legislative organization have emphasized different aspects
of restrictive rules. For instance, the distributive perspective considers restrictive rules to
facilitate giant log-rolls among legislators on distributive policy. This perspective sees the
committee system as a mechanism to distribute particularistic benefits to multiple and heterogeneous constituents (Mayhew 1974; Weingast and Marshall 1988). In an ideal setting,
this mutually beneficial agreement can be obtained through the norm of reciprocity between members and committees. Long-run durability, however, can be guaranteed only by
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a more formal enforcement mechanism such as restrictive rules (Fiorina 1987; Weingast
1991).1 Therefore, under the distributive perspective, restrictive rules bind members with
diverse policy interests together in order to commit to pre-arranged plans.
On the other hand, the informational perspective treats restrictive rules as an incentive
mechanism for committee specialization. Under this perspective, the committee system is
designed to provide the parent chamber with informational benefits regarding the policy
outcome (Krehbiel 1991). In order for committees to convey costly but accurate information, there should exist incentives, one of which is an adoption of restrictive rules (Gilligan
and Krehbiel 1987, 1989).
Third perspective is partisan, where special rules are considered as a tool to pursue
partisan goals. In general, the Rules Committee that reports every special rule to the floor is
considered the Speaker’s committee (Sinclair 1995). And, it is known to provide the party
leadership with both positive and negative agenda control power (Cox and McCubbins
1993, 2005). Moreover, as Dion and Huber (1996) argue, the use of restrictive rules actually
shifts a policy outcome from the floor median toward the majority party median.
Because these three perspectives are competing against one another, scholarly attention
has been given to a test for which perspective is better served. Marshall (2002), for instance,
derives and tests several hypotheses on the adoption of restrictive rules. He first presents
three major expectations: (1) the distributive perspective suggests that restrictive rules are
more likely to be used for pork barrel legislation; (2) the informational perspective argues
that the use of restrictive rules are negatively correlated with committee homogeneity and
committee outliers; and (3) the partisan perspective claims that restrictive rules are desired
when the committee is close to the majority party median. According to him, while no
1

There is some disagreement on this particular point. Shapiro (1987) and Bach and Smith (1988) argue
that restrictive rules preclude logrolling. In this chapter, I rely on accounts from the original distributive
perspective.
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single theoretical account is entirely robust over time, the partisan perspective turns out to
be the most reliable explanation during the recent period.
Roberts (2008) moves beyond the contemporary period, and conducts a similar test for
the late 19th and early 20th century House. According to him, what drives the adoption
of restrictive rules are mainly partisan factors such as intra-party agreements, inter-party
disagreements, and a loyal Rules Committee.
While different perspectives provide us with rich stories about why and how restrictive
rules are adopted, the effect of restrictive rules on our main interest, dimensionality, was
barely known to the literature. A general idea starts with a simple observation that the period for increased use of restrictive rules corresponds to the period for increased dominance
of unidimensional policy space. However, there should be a more rigorous assessment of
the theoretical and empirical relationship between restrictive rules and dimensionality.

4.3

Manipulation of Dimensionality and Special Rules

Although he is silent on the explicit connection between special rules and dimensionality,
Riker (1986) sheds light on this relationship by introducing a concept of “heresthetics.”
Heresthetics means the art of political manipulation, where politicians structure the world
strategically so that they can win the game. One of the most efficient ways to conduct this
endeavor, according to Riker, is through manipulating dimensionality. That is to introduce
a new dimension that could be very salient to players in order to upset the current equilibrium.2 This becomes extremely powerful because the manipulation works even though
those who are manipulated know the fact that they are being manipulated. Once a new
2
The idea that self-interested politicians may strategically introduce a new dimension is not at all new.
Literature on party realignments has focused on the role that new issues play in disrupting an existing party
system. Refer to Sundquist (1983) for more detail.
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salient dimension is revealed, the salience affects everyone regardless of their attitudes
toward the new dimensional issue.
For example, Evans (1994) argues that committee leaders utilize “distributive” dimensions in order to attract floor members to vote for them, despite the ideological opposition
to the bill itself. She examines the 1987 highway and urban mass transit reauthorization
bill with a special focus on the inclusion of highway “demonstration” projects to the bill.
She finds that members who received demonstration projects were significantly more likely
to support the bill, and that interviews with congressional staffs verified the strategic considerations surrounding the passage of this bill.
In addition, Hixon and Marshall (2007) provide a similar analysis with the 1997 emergency supplemental appropriations bill. Among others, they examine why members switch
their votes on two different special rules votes for the same bill. They find that vote switchers were reacting to constituency interests (i.e. the currency paper business), not to their
ideological considerations. Therefore, similar to Evans (1994), they conclude that party
leaders try to utilize a strategy that adds an additional secondary dimension into a bill in
order to attract “moderate” members to vote along the party line.
While these are all geared toward a rationale for the inclusion of distributive policies
into a bill, exactly same type of arguments can be made to explain the explicit partisan use
of dimensionality. Consider a situation where the committee of the bill origin comes up
with their own proposal, perhaps not entirely related to the liberal-conservative dimension.
When it is reported to the floor, party leaders could include several amendments that belong
primarily to the liberal-conservative dimension with the hope that this new (but liberalconservative) dimension becomes the salient “secondary” dimension about which Riker
spoke.
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Figure 4.1: Manipulation by Utilizing Dimensionality
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Figure 4.1 nicely captures this scenario. The “dim. A” axis is the dimension of committee’s interest or jurisdiction.3 The point “Comm.” represents the committee proposal,
possibly the committee median on the “dim. A” axis. “Amdt.” 1, 2, 3 indicates a list of
amendments specified through the special rule. They look all similar with respect to the A
dimension, but different with respect to the B dimension. Probably, the “dim. B” axis is
the dimension that party leaders as well as the party itself care mostly about, which is the
liberal-conservative dimension. Multiple amendments are likely to be offered because this
could increase the saliency of a new dimension (“dim. B” axis). Finally, legislators vote on
four alternatives, which are all aligned on the “new” liberal-conservative dimension. The
final outcome is the median on the “dim. B” axis.
With a very well designed special rule, party leaders can actually manipulate the process
and produce a voting coalition based on the liberal-conservative dimension. In that way,
party leaders can have their preferred outcome, and, at the same time, minimize the possible
influence of unexpected dimensions to ruin the contents of the pre-arranged bill.
One consequence from this manipulation process is that the final voting record looks
as if it were unidimensional. If the special rule allows a certain list of amendments, such
as Amdt. 1, Amdt. 2, and Amdt. 3 in Figure 4.1, then the original dimension from the
committee stage (“dim. A”) disappears and only the new liberal-conservative dimension
(“dim. B”) stands out from the standard roll call voting analysis: a final passage vote could
be well predicted by the liberal-conservative voting bloc.
The question, then, is how often we experience manipulations described by Evans
(1994) and Hixon and Marshall (2007), and how often we see my alternative “partisan”
manipulations in Figure 4.1. Wright and Schaffner (2002) and Jenkins (1999) give us
3

This “dim. A” needs not be always non liberal-conservative dimension. However, when committee decisions are about entirely non liberal-conservative issues, the partisan manipulation of dimensionality becomes
more obvious.
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a clue. A comparative study of state legislatures shows that “partisan” legislatures produce more unidimensional policy space than a “non-partisan” legislature - Nebraska - does
(Wright and Schaffner 2002). Similarly, the “non-partisan” Confederate Congress during
the Civil War period produces more multidimensional policy space than the “partisan” U.S.
Congress does (Jenkins 1999). Therefore, if partisan considerations are the main factors,
then we are more likely to observe my alternative type of manipulations.
Additionally, I argue that the manipulation through distributive dimensions could result
in no change for the dimensional structure of roll call voting. As rightly noted in Hixon
and Marshall (2007) and Smith (2007), persuasion aimed at a very few moderates might
not produce statistically significant effects, although they are surely one of the most substantively significant effects. As shown in Figure 4.2, vote switching by a small number
of moderate members could only change the estimated location of the bill, with pretty
much same estimated dimensional structure. This is especially true because an additional
distributive benefits are usually targeted at the very edge of the voting bloc.
Another way to describe this argument is to use the language of existing literature on
parties. With respect to positive agenda control, a unidimensional policy space would be
appealing for two reasons. First, party leaders can form “easy” floor coalitions (Cox and
McCubbins 1993) because the liberal-conservative distinction is an “effective default cleavage” in Congress (Wright and Schaffner 2002, 370). Second, political parties can reinforce
a “clear” image or brand name from a ready-made liberal-conservative distinction.
Moreover, a unidimensional policy space would also be appealing in the sense of negative agenda control. According to Cox and McCubbins (2005), the worst scenario for
the parties, especially for the majority party, would be an “ugly” defeat in voting. When
the policy space is multidimensional, there can always exist unexpected losses: the chaos
theorem (McKelvey 1976; Schofield 1978). But, a unidimensional policy space is more
likely to provide the majority party leaders with predicted outcomes. Therefore, by and
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Figure 4.2: Pork Barrel Politics and Dimensionality
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large, the use of restrictive rules (i.e., allowing selective amendments) could result in a
more “unidimensionally-looking” policy space.4
One could easily think of two alternative explanations.5 First, the distributive perspective would predict the very opposite of my partisan perspective. Since the restrictive rules
are important for binding together a giant log-rolling coalition, they are necessarily correlated with high dimensions and diverse policies. Moreover, if distributive considerations are the main factor when forming floor coalitions, as in Evans (1994) and Hixon and
Marshall (2007), then the use of restrictive rules could possibly protect distributive dimensions throughout the amending process, therefore, generate a more multidimensional policy
space.6
Second, the informational perspective would predict no relationship between the use
of restrictive rules and the dimensionality of bills. This is mainly because special rules
here serve for informational benefits of the entire chamber. In addition, the informational
perspective, at first, assumes a unidimensional policy space, so there can be no room for
any variation in dimensionality.
To summarize, three different perspectives of legislative organization have entirely different implications on the role of restrictive rules with respect to the dimensionality, as
nicely shown in Table 4.1. The partisan perspective predicts that the use of restrictive rules
decreases the dimensionality of bills. According to the distributive perspective, restrictive
rules are more likely to be related with high dimensional bills. And, no relationship is
predicted or desired under the informational perspective. Therefore, in some sense, an em4

It could be really unidimensional. But, it suffices to make the policy space look unidimensional.

5

I derive alternative explanations from the two prominent perspectives on legislative organizations. However, these are not explicitly considered in the original literature.
6

As pointed above, I believe that this effect could be minimal.
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Table 4.1: Predicted Relationship with Dimensionality
Increase (+) or Decrease (-) Dimensions
Restrictive rules - main focus
- Partisan perspective
- Distributive perspective
- Informational perspective
Polarization
Issue domain
- Agriculture
- Civil rights
Complexity
- Multiple bills
- Multiple referral

−
+
NO
−
+
+
+
+

pirical analysis on the relationship between restrictive rules and dimensionality could be a
nice opportunity to test these three general perspectives.
To make the empirical analysis complete, the test for the relationship should be controlled by several other important factors from the literature, as also shown in Table 4.1.
Most prominent is the effect of polarization over time (Roberts, Smith and Haptonstahl
2008). Issue domains, especially agriculture and civil rights, are known to affect dimensionality (Crespin and Rohde 2007; Roberts, Smith and Haptonstahl 2008). The complexity
of an individual bill is also a consideration (Hurwitz, Moiles and Rohde 2001). Because
these control factors are repeatedly reported to greatly influence dimensionality, it would
be best to find a significant relationship between the use of restrictive rules and the dimensionality of bills, even after controlling these effects.

4.4

Empirical Analysis

I have conducted an empirical analysis for the 23 Congresses of the 1947-1994 period.
Specifically, I have focused on every piece of “major legislation” identified by Clinton
and Lapinski (2006) in this period, which yields 230 bills. Among those, I selected all
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legislation that had a roll call voting record, which yields a total observation of 186 bills
(80.87%). The Appendix includes the list of all legislation and roll call votes that are
subject to the analysis in this chapter.
The dependent variable is the dimensionality of individual legislation. Following Poole
and Rosenthal (1997, 29-30, 48-51), it is measured by (PRE2 - PRE1) of the bill’s final passage vote, which is the improvement of the proportional reduction in error7 from the
one-dimensional DW-NOMNATE model to the two-dimensional DW-NOMINATE model.8
A larger value means that a bill is less unidimensional (i.e., more likely to be multidimensional), and the distribution of the variable is shown in Figure 4.3.
The key independent variables are the contents of special rules for each individual legislation. I collect and code every special rule that is issued and recorded in House Journal
and/or Congressional Record. The first group of variables are closed vs. open rules:9
• Open rule / modified open rule: allows any amendments under the five minute rule10
• Modified closed rule: permits only those amendments designated by the Rules Committee
• Closed rule: permits no amendments to be offered
7
PRE = (Minority Vote − DW-NOMINATE Classification Errors) ÷ (Minority Vote). This actually measures how well the ideal points, recovered from the DW-NOMINATE model, predict the final passage vote.
An alternative way to measure the dimensionality of individual bills is to use optimal classification (OC)
methods (Poole 2000, 2005) by utilizing multiple votes for a given bill. However, there are not enough votes
to conduct the OC methods especially prior to 1973, when the House adopted the electronic voting in the
Committee of the Whole (Roberts and Smith 2003).
8

There could be an alternative way to specify this measure: marginal PRE12 = ((1 - PRE2) - (1 - PRE1))
÷ (1 - PRE1). It is advocated by Roberts, Smith and Haptonstahl (2008). However, substantive conclusions
in this chapter do not change by adopting this alternative measure.
9

I follow the official categorization by the Committee on Rules of the U.S. House of Representatives:
http://www.rules.house.gov/lpp/pop31599.htm. Accessed on February 11, 2010.
10

Modified open rules are basically open rules but have an overall time limit on the amendment process
and/or a requirement of amendments printed in Record.
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Figure 4.3: Histogram of (PRE2 - PRE1)
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And, the next group of special rule contents variables (all dummies) include:
• Whether or not waiver is granted
• Whether or not the rule allows certain amendments only
• Whether or not amendments are listed in the special rule itself
• Whether or not all amendments are prohibited
• Whether or not there is a requirement for advanced notice of amendments
• Whether or not there is a time limit on amendment debate
In addition, I also record the number of bills (introduced bills) that are associated with
each piece of legislation, and the number of standing committees that each bill is referred
to. I use the Clausen code for the issue contents of the legislation, which I simply take
from Poole and Rosenthal’s website,11 where 5 categories are recorded: (1) government
management of the economy; (2) social welfare; (3) agriculture; (4) civil liberties; and (5)
others. In order to control time effects (or polarization effects), I also include Congress
number and Congress number squared.12
Because the dependent variable is continuous, I employ the ordinary least squares
(OLS) estimation for multivariate linear regression models. There are two groups of models: one using closed vs. open rules categorization, and another using detailed contents
dummies. In addition, I estimate models first with special rules variables only, and later
with the control variables included.
Table 4.2 shows the summary results for four models. First and foremost, an adoption
of restrictive special rules significantly decreases the dimensionality of legislation across
all four model specifications. When the closed vs. open rules categorization is used in
Model 1, both modified closed rules and closed rules are associated with decreased dimen11

http://voteview.com/dw-nominate_textfile.htm. Accessed on March 15, 2010.

12

This quadratic formula is to capture polarization after the 1970s, not before (Wooldridge 2003).
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Table 4.2: Determinants of Bill-Level Dimensionality
Model 1
-0.079*
(0.019)
-0.083*
(-0.024)

Special rule - Modified closed
Special rule - Closed
Waiver granted

Model 2
-0.074*
(0.017)
-0.126
(0.067)

Model 3

-0.050*
(0.024)
-0.075*
(0.024)
0.098
(0.052)
-0.039
(0.022)
-0.028
(0.038)
-0.038
(0.040)

Model 4

-0.037
(0.020)
Certain amendments only
-0.062*
(0.022)
Amendments listed in special rule
0.050
(0.032)
All amendments prohibited
-0.033
(0.072)
Advanced notice of amendments
0.026
(0.071)
Time limit on amendment debate
0.004
(0.036)
Congress
0.088*
0.083*
(0.037)
(0.042)
Congress-squared
-0.001*
-0.001*
(0.000)
(0.000)
Clausen issue - Social welfare
0.034
0.029
(0.024)
(0.024)
Clausen issue - Agriculture
0.041
0.027
(0.029)
(0.032)
Clausen issue - Civil liberties
0.295*
0.272*
(0.083)
(0.083)
Clausen issue - Others
0.001
0.001
(0.021)
(0.022)
Number of bills
0.030
0.025
(0.017)
(0.016)
Number of committees
0.025*
0.021*
(0.008)
(0.008)
(Intercept)
0.099*
-3.791*
0.104*
-3.516*
(0.015)
(1.692)
(0.017)
(1.931)
N
186
186
186
186
R2
0.046
0.335
0.096
0.339
F-statistic
9.71*
4.05*
4.02*
2.87*
OLS; heteroskedasity-robust standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.05; “(modified) open” is the
base category for Special rule; “Government management of the economy” is the base category
for Clausen issue
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sionality. This is similar even after controlling several important variables (in Model 2).
Modified closed rules are consistently significant in reducing the dimensionality of legislation. And, closed rules have somewhat greater effects on low dimensionality than modified
closed rules even though its statistical significance does not entirely reach the conventional
threshold in Model 2 (t = -1.88, p = 0.083).
When detailed content dummies are used in Model 3 and Model 4, waivers and amendment restrictions turn out to be significant in lowering the dimensionality of legislation.
As in Model 2, these effects are still valid even after including several control variables
(in Model 4). If the special rule allows certain amendments only, then it is more likely
to generate low dimensionality. And, granting waivers has somewhat smaller effects than
amendment restrictions (p-value changes to 0.071 in Model 4).
The control variables in Model 2 and Model 4 largely show expected patterns. A
slightly higher level of dimensionality is the norm in the 1940s, and it increases a little bit
until around the late 1960s,13 after which it decreases. This generally fits our expectation
for polarization. When the legislation is about civil liberties, it tends to be multidimensional. Agricultural issues, on the other hand, are not entirely multidimensional, which is
different from the expectations of the literature. Lastly, if the legislation is more complex
(i.e., the legislation is associated with more bills and involved in more committees), then it
tends to have multidimensional policy space.

4.5

Discussion

It should be reemphasized that the original three perspectives do not automatically provide us with predictions in Table 4.1. My theory on the partisan manipulation of dimenb
When y = ax2 + bx + c, where a < 0, b > 0, the value y has its maximum at x = − 2a
. Model 2 shows
0.0888
that the dimensionality is maximized in the 89th Congress (= 2×0.0005 ).
13
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sionality is actually a mixture of the partisan perspective of Cox and McCubbins (1993,
2005) and the heresthetics theory of Riker (1986). First, Cox and McCubbins’ partisan perspective suggests that political parties have an incentive to create a unidimensional voting
bloc. Since the liberal-conservative distinction is the default cleavage in Congress, a voting coalition could be easily constructed along this liberal-conservative dimension. With
this voting bloc occurring regularly, the party image (or party brand name) is clearly reinforced over time. In addition, political parties can avoid unpredictable defeats due to
multidimensional voting. Second, my partisan manipulation theory builds upon Riker and
argues that a well-designed special rule could effectively produce a unidimensional voting
record. Amendments specified in the special rule make the liberal-conservative dimension
salient among legislators. Using this new dimension, political parties promote “partisanly”
desirable policy outcomes.
On the other hand, my theoretical account more or less contradicts both the distributive
and the informational perspectives. At first, the manipulation of dimensionality appears
to support the distributive perspective: distributive policy benefits are added in order to
create a sufficient voting coalition. However, as I demonstrated in Figure 4.2, this effort
has a selective focus at the margin of voting bloc, and is not a manipulation of dimensional
“structure” for all legislators. The distributive perspective instead suggests that the use
of restrictive rules binds together a giant log-rolling coalition, which is inevitably related
with multidimensional policy space in nature. This is the very opposite of my partisan
manipulation of dimensionality by use of restrictive rules.
The informational perspective does not allow a room for partisan manipulation of dimensionality. Any attempts to manipulate the dimensionality to promote a certain interest
would reduce the informational benefits that committees bring to the floor. If so, the policy
space should be completely unrelated with the use of restrictive rules. Rather, it should
depend solely on the underlying true preference structure of legislators.
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By and large, my theoretical account for the relationship between restrictive rules and
low dimensionality could be considered as additional evidence for the partisan perspective,
if not a pure derivative of it. Although the empirical assessment of this relationship does
not entirely determine the relevance for each perspective, it could reveal some dynamics
underneath the use of restrictive rules at least in a more systematic way.
An empirical analysis with a new collection of data indicates that restrictive rules contribute to lower dimensionality. As such, this strongly supports my partisan manipulation
theory, and ultimately the partisan perspective in general as an explanation of the relationship between restrictive rules and dimensionality. Both the distributive perspective and the
informational perspective, on the other hand, do not seem to provide us with relevant rationale. To reiterate, political parties and party leaders are likely to utilize restrictive rules in
order to manipulate dimensionality.

4.6

Conclusion

Despite rich research on dimensionality in the U.S. Congress, we have not yet answered
basic questions on the determinants of dimensionality. This paper is one of the first attempts
to assess the variation in dimensionality for individual bills. When doing so, I focus on the
role of restrictive rules as well as several usual suspects. I derive predictions in conjunction
with three perspectives of legislative organization, and test their relevance in explaining the
relationship between restrictive special rules and dimensionality. Ultimately, the partisan
perspective provides us with the most reliable rationale. Political parties are intentionally
reducing dimensionality by the use of restrictive rules in order to construct “easy” floor
coalitions and “clear” party image.
While this paper nicely shows a general pattern after World War II, there could be a
much more rigorous and detailed examination of this trend. For example, the paper deals
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with only major legislation, so other types of legislation might (or might not) produce different patterns in dimensionality. The period of the analysis here covers only a Democratic
majority, but a different majority party could have entirely different dynamics regarding
the relationship between restrictive rules and dimensionality. In essence, a more nuanced
explanation is expected for future research.
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4.7

Appendix

The following is the list of major legislation identified by Clinton and Lapinski (2006)
that are also included in the DW-NOMINATE estimation by Poole and Rosenthal (1997).
The original list in Clinton and Lapinski (2006) includes 230 bills in total for the 19471994 period. However, 44 bills are excluded in the DW-NOMINATE estimation because
they have no roll call voting record (12 bills) or they were passed by near-unanimous votes
(32 bills). If there is a final passage vote, this vote is used to calculate PRE’s of each legislation (162 bills in this category). If not, other available votes are used: the selection
order is (1) conference report vote (17 bills), (2) veto override vote (1 bill), (3) motion to
recommit vote (2 bills), and (4) amendment vote (4 bills).

Table 4.3: List of Legislation included in the Analysis
Congress
80

Year
1947

1948
81

1949

1950

82

1951

1952

Bill
s938
hr3020
s564
hr4790
s2202
s1070
hr5856
hr5895
hr5345
hr1211
hr6000
hr7797
hr9176
hr9490
hr8920
hr1612

Vote Used
final passage
final passage
final passage
final passage
final passage
final passage
final passage
final passage
final passage
final passage
final passage
final passage
final passage
final passage
final passage
amendment

hr5113
hr4473

final passage
final passage

hr5678

veto override

Contents of Legislation
Greece and Turkey
Labor Management Relations Act of 1947
Presidential succession
Revenue Act of 1948
Foreign Assistance Act of 1948
Establish a national housing policy
Fair Labor Standards Act
Foreign Military Assistance Act
Agriculture Act
Authority of President under Tariff Act
Social Security Act Amendments of 1949
Economic Cooperation Act of 1950
Defense Production Act of 1950
Registration of Communist organizations
Revenue Act of 1950
Authority of President to enter into foreign trade
agreement
Foreign military and economic aids
Increase individual and corporate income taxes and
excise taxes
Revise immigration laws to remove some discriminations
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Congress
83

84

Year
1953
1954

1955

1956

85

1957
1958

86

1959
1960

87

1961

1962

88

1963

1964

Bill
hr4198
s2150

Vote Used
final passage
final passage

hr7839

final passage

hr8300
hr9757
hr9366

final passage
final passage
final passage

hr1

final passage

s2168
s500
hr10875
hr10660
hr7225
hjres117
hr6127
hr7999
hr12591
s4071
hr13247
s50
s1555
hr8601
hr12580
s1
hr3935
s1922
h6027
s1643
hr7500
hr9118
s1991
hr10606
hr11970
hr10650
hr12

final passage
final passage
final passage
final passage
final passage
final passage
final passage
final passage
final passage
final passage
motion to recommit
final passage
conference report
final passage
final passage
final passage
final passage
final passage
final passage
conference report
final passage
final passage
final passage
final passage
final passage
final passage
final passage

s1576
hr6143
hr6518
hr8363
hr6196
hr7152
s6
s2642

final passage
final passage
final passage
final passage
final passage
final passage
final passage
final passage

hr10222

final passage

Contents of Legislation
Submerge Lands Act
Create the Lawrence seaway development corporation
Provide for housing construction and elimination
of slums
Revise the internal revenue laws
Amend the atomic energy act
Provide for expanded coverage and survivors insurance program
Extend authority of President to enter into trade
agreements
Increase the national minimum hourly wage
Construct Colorado river project
Enact agricultural act, soil bank
Federal aid road act
Social security act, disability insurance
Middle east economic and military cooperation
Civil rights act
Statehood for Alaska
Trade agreement extension act
Agricultural price support programs
National defense education act
Give Hawaii statehood
Prevent certain abuses in labor organizations
Civil Rights Act of 1960
Social Security Amendments of 1960
Area Redevelopment Act
Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1961
Housing Act of 1961
Social Security Amendments of 1961
Agricultural Act of 1961
Peace Corps Act
Establish US Arms Control Agency
Manpower development and training act
Public welfare amendments of 1962
Trade expansion act
Revenue act
Training physicians, dentists, and professional
public health personnel.
Provide assistance in combating mental retardation
Establish college aid
Programs for the prevention of air pollution
Amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954
Project to lower costs of cotton production
Enforce the constitutional right to vote
Assistance to develop mass transportation system
Mobilize the human and financial resources to
combat poverty in the US
Strengthen the agricultural economy
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Congress
89

Year
1965

1966

90

1967
1968

91

1969
1970

92

1971

1972

Bill
s3
hr2363

Vote Used
final passage
final passage

hr6675
s1564
hr7984
hr6927

final passage
final passage
final passage
final passage

s1483

motion to recommit

hr2580
s2084

final passage
final passage

hr9567
hr13712
hr15963
s3708

final passage
final passage
final passage
final passage

s985
s1160
hr2516

final passage
final passage
final passage

hr5037
hr15414
s3497
hr16363
s827
hr13270
hr4249
hr17070
s30
hr18546
hr18582
hr4690

final passage
conference report
final passage
final passage
final passage
final passage
final passage
final passage
final passage
final passage
final passage
final passage

s31

final passage

hr10947
s382

conference report
conference report

hr1746

final passage

s659
hr15390

final passage
final passage

s2770

final passage

Contents of Legislation
Appalachian Regional Development Act of 1965
Strengthen nation’s elementary and secondary
school education
Social Security Amendments of 1965, medicare
Enforce the 15th amendment to the Constitution
Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965
Establish Department of Housing and Urban Development
Establish National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965
Provide for scenic development and road beautification of the highway system
Higher Education Act of 1965
Increase the federal minimum wage
Create a cabinet level department of transportation
Demonstration cities and metropolitan development act
Fair packaging and labeling act
Public Broadcasting Act of 1967
Penalties for interference with persons exercising
their civil rights and prohibit discrimination in sale
or rental of housing
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, 1968
Revenue and Expenditure Control Act, 1968
Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968
Wholesome Poultry Products Act
Establish a national trails system
Tax Reform Act of 1969
Extend the Voting Rights Act of 1965
Postal Reorganization and Salary Adjustment Act
Organize Crime Control Act of 1970
Agricultural Act of 1970
Amend the Food Stamp Act of 1964
Increase the ceiling on the public debt limit and
provide a 10% increase in Social Security benefits
Provide federal assistance for programs of public
service employment during periods of high unemployment
Revenue Act of 1971
Promote fair practices on the conduct of election
campaigns for federal offices
Promote equal employment opportunities for
American workers
To enact omnibus education amendments of 1972
To extend through 10/31/72 the $450 billion public
debt limit
Amend the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
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Congress
92

93

Year
1972

1973

1974

94

1975

1976

Bill
hr14370

Vote Used
final passage

hr10729

final passage

s3419

final passage

hr1
s1888
s502

final passage
final passage
amendment

hjres542

conference report

s1081

final passage

s1435
hr11333

final passage
final passage

hr9142

final passage

s2747

final passage

hr7130

final passage

s3066

final passage

hr11510

final passage

s3044

conference report

s386

conference report

hr10710
hr2166
hr6219
hr10481

final passage
final passage
final passage
final passage

s622
s2718
hr10612
s3149

final passage
amendment
final passage
final passage

hr10210

final passage

s507

final passage

Contents of Legislation
Authorize federal collection of state individual income taxes and other purposes
Amend the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act
Protect consumers against unreasonable risk of injury from hazardous products
Amend the Social Security Act
Extend and amend the Agricultural Act of 1907
Authorize appropriations for the construction of
certain highways
Govern the use of the Armed Forces by the president during the absence of a declaration of war
Establish a federal policy granting rights-of-way
across federal lands
Reorganize the governmental structure of the DC
Provide a multi-phased 11% increase in Social Security benefits
Provide for restructuring of the rail transportation
system in the midwestern and northeastern regions
Provide a 3-stage increase in the hourly minimum
wage
Reform congressional procedures for enactment of
fiscal policy
Housing and Community Development Act of
1974
Provide a new Energy Research and Development
Administration
Provide for public financing of Federal primary
and general election campaigns
Authorize grants to states and local agencies to assure adequate commuter transportation service in
urban areas
Trade Reform Act of 1973
Tax Reduction Act of 1975
Amend and extend the Voting Rights Act of 1965
Provide seasonal financing for the city of New
York
Provide standby energy authority
Enact Rail Services Act of 1975
Proposed Tax Reform Act of 1976
Require restrictions in testing and use of chemical
substance to protect human health and the environment
Require states to extend unemployment compensation coverage
Provide for the management, protection and development of the national resources land
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Congress
95

Year
1977

1978

96

97

1979
1980

1981

Bill
hr3477

Vote Used
final passage

hr2

final passage

s826
hr6161
s275
hr3744

final passage
final passage
final passage
final passage

hr9346

final passage

hr3199

final passage

s2640
hr13511
hr5037
hr5289
hr5263
hr5146
hr4018
s210
hr5860
hr4986

final passage
final passage
conference report
conference report
conference report
conference report
conference report
final passage
final passage
final passage

hr3919
s932

conference report
final passage

s2245
s1946

final passage
final passage

hr39

final passage

hr7020

final passage

hr4242
hr3982

final passage
final passage

Contents of Legislation
Enact the Tax Reduction and Simplification Act of
1977
Enact the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation
Act of 1977
Establish a Department of Energy
Enact the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977
Enact the Food and Agricultural Act of 1977
Increase the minimum levels under the Fair Labor
Standards Act
Enact the Social Security Financing Amendments
of 1977
Enact the Federal Water Pollution control Act
amendments of 1977
Reform the Civil Service laws
Enact the Revenue Act of 1978
Revise the duty on certain items
Revise the duty on certain items
Revise the duty on certain items
Revise the duty on certain items
Revise the duty on certain items
Establish a Department of Education
Authorize loan guarantees to the Chrysler Corp
Provide for a gradual lifting of rate ceiling on time
and savings deposits and authorize certain financial institutions to offer interest-bearing checking
accounts
Impose a windfall profits tax on domestic crude oil
Authorize funds to establish the production of synthetic fuels, gasohol, solar energy, renewable resources, geothermal energy, to establish an energy
conservation program and energy supply targets,
and to extend the Defense Production Act
Streamline regulations of the motor carrier industry
Provide railroads with more pricing rate flexibility
and contract provisions
Designate certain public lands in the state of
Alaska for inclusion under permanent federal ownership and management for protection of their resource values
Authorize funds for fiscal 1981-86 to provide for
the safe and adequate treatment of hazardous substances released into the environment
Amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954
Provide for reconciliation pursuant to section 301
of the First Concurrent Resolution on the Budget
for FY82
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Congress
97

Year
1981

Bill
s884

Vote Used
final passage

hr4995

final passage

hr3112

final passage

hr4961
hr6267
hr6211

conference report
final passage
final passage

1983

hr1900

final passage

1984

s675
hr4170

final passage
final passage

hjres648
hr2577
hjres372
hr2100

final passage
final passage
conference report
final passage

1986

hr4868

amendment

1989

hr3838
hr1278

conference report
final passage

1990

hr2710
s933

final passage
final passage

hr5835

final passage

s1630
s566

final passage
final passage

s2830

final passage

1991

s358
s1745
hr2950

final passage
final passage
final passage

1992

s12

final passage

s2532

final passage

hr776

final passage

1982

98

99

101

102

1985

Contents of Legislation
Revise and extend programs to provide price support and productions incentives for farmers to assure an abundance of food and fiber
Make appropriations for the Dept of Defense for
fiscal 1982
Extend certain provisions of the Voting Rights Act
of 1965
Make misc. changes in the tax laws
Assist the thrift industry
Authorize appropriations through FY89 to improve
the nation’s highway system
Implement the consensus recommendations of the
National Commission on Social Security Reform
Authorize funds for FY84 for the DOD
Provide for certain spending reductions and revenue increases for FYs 1985-1987
Make continuing appropriations for the FY85
Appropriate supplemental funds for FY85
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings legislation setting
Revise agricultural programs and extend them
through FY90
Impose economic and other sanctions against
South Africa
Revise the federal income tax system
Reform, recapitalize and consolidate the fed. deposit insurance system
Increase the minimum wage
Establish a clear and comprehensive prohibition
against discrimination on the basis of disability
Provide for reconciliation pursuant to section 4 of
the concurrent resolution on the budget for FY91
Amend the Clean Air Act
To achieve more affordable housing and to increase
home ownership
Extend and revise agricultural price-support and
related programs
Amend the Immigration and Nationality Act
Amend the Civil Rights Act of 1964
Develop a national intermodal surface transportation system
Ensure carriage on cable television of local news
and other programming
Enact the Freedom for Russia and Emerging
Eurasian Democracies and Open Market Support
Act
Provide for improved energy efficiency
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Congress
103

Year
1993

1994

Bill
hr2

Vote Used
final passage

hr2264

final passage

hr2010
hr1025

final passage
final passage

hr3450

final passage

hr1804
s21

final passage
final passage

hr5110

final passage

Contents of Legislation
Establish national voter registration procedures for
federal elections
Provide for the reconciliation pursuant to Section 7
of the concurrent resolution on the budget for fiscal
1994
Establish a Corp. for National Service
Provide for a waiting period before the purchase of
a handgun and for the establish of a national criminal background check
Implement the North American Free Trade Agreement
Provide a national framework for education reform
Designate certain lands in the California desert as
wilderness
Approve and implement the trade agreements concluded in the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade
negotiations
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Chapter 5
Conclusion

The U.S. Congress is multidimensional. It is multidimensional because it represents various interests of American people. At the same time, it requires a special devise or mechanism that overcomes the problems caused by this multidimensional policy structure. Political parties, standing committees, and legislative rules are the primary ones in the U.S.
House of Representatives. They efficiently and effectively structure the legislative motivations and interests in a way that provides reliable coalitions as well as stable policy
outcomes. From time to time, the majority party promotes rules changes for its ruling
and creates special rules for manipulating the dimensionality. At the same time, this consequently makes the majority party vulnerable to threats of cross-party coalitions. In addition,
the majority party makes use of the committee system in order to promote their collective
policy interests. As such, each chapter provides nuanced stories about different stages of
the legislative process.
Chapter 2, Conditional Nature of Rules Changes, examines why the U.S. House of
Representatives has changed its standing rules regarding the principle of majority rule and
minority rights. I begin by taking a critical look at previous studies on this subject, after
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which I propose an alternative theory on the conditional nature of rules changes. The
empirical findings reveal that different combinations of factors are required for the two
distinct types of rules changes. In particular, the size and homogeneity of the majority party
are the main factors for promoting majority rule while the size of the majority party and the
dimensionality of policy space are the main factors for creating minority rights.
Chapter 3, Minority Party Members on Committees, questions why a generic legislature
allows minority party members on committees. If the majority party considers the minority
a burden, then it could choose to exclude minority party members entirely from the committee system. This has, however, rarely happened in history. This chapter provides one
possible explanation to this puzzle via a simple signaling game. In equilibrium, I show that
the majority party has an incentive to include the minority party delegation on the committee. By allowing the minority to make a public speech on the uncertainty, the majority
leadership can constrain the majority committee delegation in a way to serve the party in
general: the majority committee delegation, in equilibrium, moderates the bill proposal in
order to respond to the minority’s public speech.
Chapter 4, Special Rules and Dimensionality, is one of the first attempts to investigate
the determinants for dimensionality of individual bills. I first develop a theory on partisan
manipulation of dimensionality by focusing especially on the role of restrictive special rules
in the House of Representatives: party leaders try to reduce the dimensionality of individual
bills in order to have clear party image and to avoid ugly defeats. I collect every piece of
“major legislation” identified by Clinton and Lapinski (2006), and record the contents of
their special rules. Ultimately, the data demonstrate that restrictive rules contribute to lower
dimensionality.
Each of the three analyses demonstrates a benefit from considering multiple theoretical
approaches. I adopt this method of analysis because legislative organizations and behaviors
of my interest are fundamentally involved with the multiple goals of individual members
113

and political parties, and, more importantly, in the conflict between the collective partisan
goals and the individual member’s goals. Furthermore, the way political parties play a
role in various stages of legislative politics is deeply related to the dimensional structure of
policy space in Congress. Political parties try to make use of the presence and the salience
of the first dimension (i.e., liberal-conservative dimension) although the policy space in
Congress is multidimensional in nature. Exactly because of this strategic choice made by
political parties, the majority party is, at the same time, vulnerable to threats by cross-party
coalitions of multidimensional issues.
While all of three essays, as well as the dissertation project as a sum, help us to better
understand legislative politics, they each have their own limitations. Because these limitations rightly make suggestions concerning future research as well, it would be best to
conclude by discussing future research topics in relation with primary limitations of each
chapter.

Conditional Nature of Rules Changes
The primary limitation of Chapter 2 is on the appropriateness of the measure for rules
changes: the measure is too crude. The unit of analysis is Congress (two-year period),
and the intensity and the importance of rules changes are not considered at all. While
this limitation applies to every work in the related literature, it does not keep us from
considering possible improvements.
First, in terms of the unit of analysis, we can deal with it only for the pre-modern period.
Standing rules in the House are right now amended and adopted at the start of each new
Congress. We cannot observe rules changes at other points of time these days. However, if
the theoretical and substantive concern is about the development of the majority rule in the
19th century, then we can construct a new set of data. An ideal data set would include not
only the rules change coding for a shorter interval of time but also the re-estimation of party
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characteristics and dimensionality variables. A new coding for rules changes will not be a
big issue, but the re-estimation of independent variables will involve a careful identification
of roll-call voting record with an employment of the optimal classification method.1
Second, we can assess the intensity of rules changes by utilizing predicted probabilities
of two types of changes. When we estimate a multinomial logit model, we can extract an
information about predicted probabilities of pro-majority and pro-minority changes. These
probabilities are based on a set of independent variables and estimated coefficients. We
usually interpret those probabilities as how much we are likely to observe a certain type
of rules changes. However, if we make an assumption that important or dramatic changes
require “stronger” driving forces than normal, we are able to relate predicted probabilities
with the importance and the intensity of rules changes. Then, a subjective judgment of each
rules change can be compared with predicted probabilities.2
Third, rules changes can be put in the left side of the equation. Certain types of rules
changes might alter the characteristics of activities on the floor, and ultimately affect the
electoral fortune of the parties. A case can be made where pro-majority changes promote an
effective governing by the majority party, which positively affects the building of the party
brand name. Or, an excess use of the majority rule and the majority party’s discipline could
force individual members not to focus on their constituency interests. Then, the influence
could be reversed. It begs an empirical examination.
While all of these endeavors are about the change in rules, the focus on individual types
of rules themselves is equally important and equally relevant for future research. For example, “failed” (or not adopted) special rules and “successful” (or adopted) discharge petitions
could be nice indicators for a weakness of the majority party. Or, we can interpret these as
1

The OC method is known to be reliable for a small number of votes (Poole 2005, 46-47).

2

We can use this assessment in order to figure out the usefulness of different statistical models.
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a strength of either the minority party or the cross-party coalition. Then, we can examine
the determinants of this variation.

Minority Party Members on Committees
As I pointed out in the discussion section of Chapter 3, my signaling model would work
fine for certain types of committees, but not for every committee over a long period of time.
For example, if one committee is totally an outlier where all the committee members are
located in the same direction against the majority party leadership, then the presence of
minority party members could not help the majority party leadership. In one sense, this
criticism is not the right one because this chapter is not answering the question of how the
majority party leadership controls their committee delegations in general. However, if the
chapter can be interpreted in a broader context, then it suggests that further research of
related topics is possible.
It comes to my immediate attention that prestige committees have disproportionately
many majority party members. The story from the current literature seems to be a very
unsatisfactory one: a loyal member with a “good” voting record can receive a committee
membership. A more interesting question would be whether or not the stacking of several
more members on the committee benefits the majority party. In addition, are they usually
from the moderate side of the party that is closer to the position of the party leadership?
Or, are they strong partisan extremists? What is the relationship between these two cases
and the collective policy interests pursued by the party leadership?
Another research question of interest is the role of “moderate” members from the majority party in terms of controlling extreme party members on committees. The proposition
in Chapter 3 predicts a quasi negative relationship between bias of the majority delegation
and that of the minority delegation. It could be applicable to the relationship between extreme majority party members and moderate majority party members on the committee.
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Once we can make a subjective judgment on who is extremist and who is moderate, we can
empirically test this relationship.

Special Rules and Dimensionality
I have looked at the relationship between the use of restrictive special rules and the low
dimensionality of final passage votes. However, the partisan manipulation theory that I
proposed in Chapter 4 is about the change in dimensionality: the bill becomes more unidimensional by receiving restrictive special rules. Therefore, the theoretical claim and the
empirical assessment are not identical.
A more direct test of my theoretical claim would be to observe the change in dimensionality throughout the amending process. It requires a collection of new data, which is a
set of roll call votes for each individual bill. After identifying these votes, we can calculate
(PRE2 - PRE1) for each vote. Then, a series of linear models can be fitted as:

(PRE2 − PRE1)i[j] = αj + βj × timei[j] + i[j] ,

where j indicates legislations and i indicates roll call votes. Note that each legislation (j)
has its own linear model fitting only with its own roll call votes (i’s) for the legislation,
and consequently acquires its own βj . One β value is assigned to each legislation, and a
negative value of β represents the decrease in dimensionality for that particular bill. A next
step is to estimate the linear model with β as a dependent variable:

βj = a + b1 × restrictive rulej + b−1 × controlsj + j ,

117

where a set of control variables from Chapter 3 would be a nice choice here as well. A theoretical interest is, then, whether or not the restrictive rule variable has a negative coefficient
(b1 < 0).
Another path to strengthen my theory on partisan manipulation of dimensionality is to
make a clear and theoretical connection between each element of restrictive special rules
and its impact on the dimensionality of the bill. Why and how does a particular restriction lead to the low level of dimensionality? This would be especially useful for recent
Congresses because there has been a significant development in uses of creative special
rules (such as self-executing rule, king-of-the-mountain rule, queen-of-the-hill rule, etc),
and most of those special rules were created and developed for the partisan purpose of the
majority party.

Although it is not directly associated with each of the three essays, the broad theme of
the dissertation can be expanded a little more by examining the strategies of party leaders.
What strategies do parties employ to pursue their collective partisan interests? In what
ways do they prioritize their goals and how does this relate to an individual legislator’s
goals? What are the differences in developing these strategies between the majority and the
minority parties? In addition, it would be best if we can also examine how these strategies
systematically relate to the electoral fortunes of both the majority and the minority parties
over time.
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